Jimmy Lenman HomePage / Metaethics Bibliography A-H

A Bibliography of Metaethics: A-H


Return to Index

I-P

Q-Z


  1. Bruce A. Ackerman

    Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: YAle University Press, 1980)

  2. Robert Ackermann

    "Consistency and Ethics" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69, 1969.

  3. E. M. Adams

    "A Critique of the Emotive Theory of Ethical Terms" in Journal of Philosophy 46, 1949.

    EMA complains that Ayer and Stevenson do not adequately analyse approbation, failing properly to distinguish it from mere liking. If we do analyse it we find it involves a cognitive element in the form of a judgement of rightness. So it is incoherent to analyse judgements of rightness in terms of approval.

    "Word-Magic and Logical Analysis in the Field of Ethics" in Journal of Philosophy 47, 1950.
    "The Nature of Ethical Inquiry" in Journal of Philosophy 48, 1951.
    "Cartesianism in Ethics" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16, 1956.
    "Mr Hare on the Role of Principles in Deciding" in Mind 65, 1956.
    "The Nature of 'Ought'" in Philosophical Studies 7, 1956.
    "'Ought' Again" in Philosophical Studies 8, 1957.
    "Hall's Analysis of "Ought"" in Journal of Philosophy 55, 1958.
    "The Theoretical and the Practical" in Review of Metaphysics 13, 1960.
    Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
    "Classical Moral Philosophy and Metaethics" in Ethics 74, 1964.
    "A Defense of Value Realism" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 4, 1966.
    "Gewirth on Reason and Morality" in Review of Metaphysics 33, 1980.
    "The Subjective Normative Structure of Agency" in Regis, Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism
    "Rationality and Morality" in Review of Metaphysics 46, 1993.
    "Emotional Intelligence and Wisdom" in Southern Journal of Philosophy36, 1998.

  4. Robert Merrihew Adams

    "Motive Utilitarianism" in Journal of Philosophy 73, 1976
    Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

  5. H. D. Aiken

    "Emotive Meaning and Ethical Terms" in Journal of Philosophy 61, 1944
    "Definitions of Value and the Moral Ideal" in Journal of Philosophy 42, 1945.
    "Evaluation and Obligation: Two Functions of Judgments in the Language of Conduct" in Journal of Philosophy 47, 1950
    "A Pluralistic Analysis of the Ethical "Ought"" In Journal of Philosophy 48, 1951.
    "The Authority of Moral Judgments" in Philosophy ad Phenomenological Research 12, 1952.
    "Definitions, Factual Premises and Ethical Conclusions" in Philosophical Review 61, 1952.
    "The Levels of Moral Discourse" in Ethics 62, 1952.
    "The Role of Conventions in Ethics" in Journal of Philosophy 49, 1952.
    "Moral Reasoning" in Ethics 64, 1953.
    "The Spectrum of Value Predications" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14, 1953.
    Reason and Conduct: New Bearings in Moral Philosophy (New York: Knopf, 1962)
    "The Concept of Moral Objectivity" in Neri-Castaneda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
    "The Problem of Evaluative Objectivity" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 4, 1966
    "Contra - The Moral Point of View" in Philosophical Exchange 3, 1980

  6. Carlos E. Alchourron

    "Logic of Norms and Logic of Normative Propositions" in Logique et Analyse 12, 1969.
    "Prescripciones y Normas: La Theoria de Castaneda" in Critica 13, 1981.
    "Para una Logica de las Razones Prima Facie" in Analisis Filosofico 16, 1996.

  7. Carlos E. Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin

    "The Expressive Conception of Norms" in Hilpinen, New Studies in Deontic Logic
    "Normative Knowledge and Truth" in Gracia, Philosophical Analysis in Latin America

  8. Carlos E. Alchourron and Antonio A. Martino

    "Logic Without Truth"" in Ratio Juris 3, 1990

    A & M urge that Jorgensen's dilemma - given that norms lack truth-values either the notion of inference is inapplicable to them or it can be characterized without reference to truth - be resolved in favour of the latter horn. (various alternatives are characterized and rejected.) For philosophical motivation they appeal to Wittgenstein's doctrine of meaning as use. They propose taking an abstract notion of consequence, which they characterize, as primitive. They then propose that the rules for the standard connectives be given, Gentzen-style, with reference to their introduction and elimination rules. For deontic logic the following basic rule is proposed:
    A1,...An|-B
    _______________
    OA1,...OAn|-OB
    A & M then show that the more standard axioms of deontic logic are derivable in terms of this rule and vice versa.
  9. Henry Allison

    "Morality and Freedom: Kant's Reciprocity Thesis" in Philosophical Review 95, 1986
    Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
    "On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical Imperative" in Philosophical Topics 19, 1991

  10. David Alm

    "Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, 2000
    "On the Reasonableness of Moral Judgments" in Social Theory and Practice 26, 2000
    "Atomism about Value" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 2004, pp. 312-331.

  11. J. E. J. Altham

    "Evaluation and Speech" in Casey, Morality and Moral Reasoning
    "The Legacy of Emotivism" in MacDonald and Wright, Fact, Scince and Morality.
    "Reflection and Confidence" in Altham and Harrison, World, Mind and Ethics

    A suggestive and intelligent critique of Williams' metaethical views. Williams has suggested that reflection on our thick concepts can destroy the ethical knowledge they embody but confidence in their practical deployment may remain possible even then. But when ethical reflection leads us to just drop some thick concept, we simply drop it and there is no residual role for confidence. If, on the other hand, the reflection takes the form of a metaethical critique it is hard to see how the damage can be limited only to some thick concepts. If reflection can destroy ethical knowledge it will, Altham suggests, destroy all of it. If the destruction is limited, we should deny that what has been destroyed was ever knowledge.
  12. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison

    (ed.) World, Mind and Ethics (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1995)

  13. William Alston

    "Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements" in Nous 2, 1968

  14. Alan Ross Anderson

    "The Logic of Norms" in Logique et Analyse 1, 1958
    "A Reduction of Deontic Logic to Alethic Modal Logic" in Mind 67, 1958.
    "On the Logic of "Commitment"" in Philosophical Sudies 10, 1959.
    "Some Nasty Problems in the Formal Logic of Ethics" in Nous 1 1967

    Anderson maintains that .It is obligatory that p. is equivalent to .If Op then V. where V is some bad state of affairs obtaining. But what kind of conditional is signaled here by .if.? Not material implication certainly as we could then infer O(p) from p. Strict implication is also an unsatisfactory reading as it is not being proposed that V is a logical consequence of Op and we in any case do not want to be able to infer O(p) from "Necessarily p". Anderson suggests that the most satisfactory reading is in terms of a notion of relevant implication he goes on to define and explore.

  15. Elizabeth Anderson

    Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)
    "Reasons, Attitudes, and Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper," in Ethics 106, 1996
    "Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods" in Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason

  16. Julia Annas

    "Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001

  17. G. E. M. Anscombe

    Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957)
    "On Brute Facts" in Analysis 18, 1958
    "Modern Moral Philosophy" in Philosophy 33, 1958

  18. Louise M. Antony

    "Nature and Norms" in Ethics 111, 2001.

    A clear and rich discussion of Nussbaum.s attempt to defend a grounding role in ethical theory for a form of Aristotelian essentialism from Williams. critique of any such idea. The basic problem is that accounts of human nature are either external, confining themselves to scientific fact, in which case they seem to have limited potential to yield ethical conclusions, or internal, explicitly normative articulations of our self-conceptions, which yield substantive ethical conclusions only because they are heavy with normative presuppositions and do not speak to those who do not share these presuppositions. In her exegesis Williams, Nussbaum makes out this external/external distinction in terms of a descriptive/normative distinction. But in her critique external accounts are assimilated to the kind of external realism she follows Putnam in rejecting. But this is to confuse independence from human values with independence from all forms of human conceptualization and to misdiagnose opposition to essentialism as opposition to metaphysical realism. The real but limited truth in essentialism is that external accounts of what humans are like point to commonalities that offer us the normative common ground we need in order successfully to address one another.s internal moral self-understandings.

  19. Lennart Aqvist

    Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987)

  20. Steven Arkonovich

    "Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism" in Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research 63, 2001

  21. Horacio Arlo Coasta, John Collins and Isaac Levi

    "DEsire-As-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference" in Analysis 55, 1995, pp. 2-5.

  22. Leslie Armour

    "The Origin of Values" in Odegard, Ethics and Justiofication

  23. Richard Arneson

    "Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction" in Social Philosophy and Policy 61, 1999, pp. 113-142.

  24. Hilliard Aronovitch

    "Reflective Equilibrium or Evolving Tradition?", Inquiry 39, 1996.

  25. Nomy Arpaly

    "On ACting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement" in Ethics 110, 2002, pp. 488-513.
    Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

  26. Robert Arrington

    Rationality, Realism and Relativism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989)

  27. R. F. Atkinson

    "Consistency in Ethics" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 39, 1965.

  28. Robert Audi

    "The Concept of Wanting" in Philosophical Studies 24, 1973.
    "Axiological Foundationalism" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, 1982.
    "A Theory of Practical Reasoning" in American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982.
    "Acting for Reasons" in Philosophical Review 95, 1986.
    "Intending, Intentional Action and Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire
    "The Architecture of Reason" in P. A.P.A. 62, Supp. 1, 1988.
    "Internalism and Externalism in Moral Epistemology" in Logos 10, 1989.
    Practical Reasoning (London: R.K.P., 1989)
    "Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, 1990, Spindel Supplement.
    "Ethical Reflectionism" in The Monist 76, 1993.
    "Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts" in Wagner, Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal
    "Acting From Virtue" in Mind 1995.
    "Intuitionism, Pluralism and the Foundations of Ethics" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge
    "Intrinsic Value and Moral Obligation" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 35, 1997
    "Moral Judgement and Reasons for Action" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
    Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
    "The Axiology of Moral Experience" in The Journal of Ethics 2, 1998.
    "Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice1, 1998, pp. 15-44.
    "Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Internalism and the Normative Authority of Desire" in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 2002.
    "Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 79-106.

  29. Bruce Aune

    "Castaneda's Theory of Morality" in Tomberlin, Hector-Neri Castaneda

  30. A. J. Ayer

    Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952), especially chapter 6.

  31. Carla Bagnoli

    "Value in the Guise of Regret" in Philosophical Explorations, 2000.
    "Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason" in Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3, 2001.
    "Moral Constructivism: a Phenomenological Argument" in Topoi, 21, 2002.

  32. Annette Baier

    Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985)
    "Extending the Limits of Moral Theory" in Journal of Philosophy 83, 1986
    Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1994)

  33. Kurt Baier

    "Objectivity in Ethics" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy26, 1948
    "S. Hampshire: Fallacies in Moral Philosophy: a Note" in Mind 59, 1950
    "Decisions and Descriptions" in Mind 60, 1951
    "Doing My Duty" in Philosophy 26, 1951
    "Good Reasons" in Philosophical Studies 4, 1953.
    "Proving A Moral Judgment" in Philosophical Studies 4, 1953
    "The Point of View of Morality" in Australiasian Jornal of Philosophy, 32 1954
    The Meaning of Life(Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957)
    The Moral Point of View (Ithaca: Cornell U. P. 1958).
    "Reasons for Doing Something" in Journal of Philosophy 61, 1964
    "Acting and Producing" in Journal of Philosophy 62, 1965
    "Action and Agent" in The Monist 49, 1965.
    "Moral Obligation" in American Philosophical Quarterly 3 1966.
    "The Concept of Value" in Journal of Value Inquiry 1, 1967.
    "Fact, Value and Norm in Stevenson's Ethics" in Nous 1, 1967
    "Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Comparability" in Philosophical Studies 24, 1973
    "Reason and Experience" in Nous 7, 1973.

    Baier objects to prescriptivism's understanding of practical discourse as imperative. His central argument is that it can make perfect sense to say both "I know that you ought to do X but please don't" and "I know I ought to X but I won't".

    "Rationality and Morality" in Erkenntnis 1977
    "Moral Reasons" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978.
    "Moral Reasons and Reasons to be Moral" in Goldman and Kim, Values and Morals.
    "The Social Source of Reason" in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association., 51, 1978.
    "The Conceptual Link Between Morality and Rationality" in Nous 16, 1982.
    "Rationality, Reason and the Good" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth.
    "Justification in Ethics" in Nomos 27, 1986.
    "Radical Virtue Ethics" in Midwest Studies 13, 1988.
    "Preference and the Good of Man" in Schilpp and Hahn, The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright
    The Rational and the Moral Order (La Salle: Ill: Open Court, 1995).
    "Comments" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society

  34. Kurt Baier and Stephen Toulmin

    "On Describing" in Mind 61, 1952.

  35. Thomas Baldwin

    "Ethical Non-Naturalism" in Hacking, Essays in Analysis

  36. Stephen W. Ball

    "Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore's Open Question Argument" in American Philosophical Quarterly 25, 1988.

    Ball argues that the OQA is is not successfully rebutted by such critics as Harman and Putnam. The objection that it is invalid as parallel reasoning might undermine such identities as that water is H2O is met by noting, firstly, that the OQA is supposed to apply primarily against analytic identies between moral and natural properties. Secondly, Ball suggests the OQA can be effective even against such property identities more generally for it offers strong evidence for the thought that we cannot establish such identities on linguistic grounds and we may appeal to supplementary arguments familiar from elsewhere in metaethics to question whether there are, in this case, the sort of extra-linguistic reasons to claim such identities as we find in science. The objection that OQA is circular can also, Ball suggests, be sidestepped if we see it as appealing not, question-beggingly, to the conceptual fact that X has property P but is not good is not self-contradictory but to the psychological fact that such a possibility seems open to ordinary users of moral concepts. Such an appeal to linguistic intuitions is not logically compelling but has the status of a strong piece of evidence against analytic naturalism.

    "Evolution, Explanation and the Fact-Value Distinction" in Biology and Philosophy 3, 1988.
    "Facts, Values and Normative Supervenience" in Philosphical Studies 55, 1989.
    "Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1991.
    "Gibbard's Evolutionary Theory of Rationality and its Ethical Implications" in Biology and Philosophy 10, 1995.

  37. Renford Bambrough

    Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge (Atlantic Highlands: Humamities Press, 1979)
    The Roots of Moral Reason" in Regis, Gewrth's Ethical Rationalism

  38. Stephen J. Barker

    "Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?" in Analysis 60, 2000
    "Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 299-317.

  39. W. H. F. Barnes

    "A Suggestion About Values" in Analysis 1934.

  40. Marcia Baron

    "Varieties of Ethics of Virtue," in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1985

  41. Jonathan Barrett

    "Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objcetion to Rottshaefer and Martinsen" in Biology and Philosophy 6, 1991.

  42. Christine Battersby

    "Morality and the Ik" in Philosophy 53 (1978)

  43. Bernard H. Baumrin

    "Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?" in American Philosophical Quarterly 5, 1968.
    "Moral Blindness" in Metaphilosophy 17, 1986.

  44. Michael Bayles

    "Intuitions in Ethics" in Dialogue 23, 1984
    "Mid-Level Principles and Justification" in Pennock and Chapman, Justification

  45. R. W. Beardsmore

    Moral Reasoning (London: Routledge, 1969)

  46. Lawrence Becker

    On Justifying Moral Judgments(London: R. K. P., 1973)

  47. Roger Beehler

    Moral Life(New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978)

  48. Ruth Benedict

    "A Defense of Moral Relativism" in The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 10, 1934 and in Sommers and Sommers, Virtue and Vice in Everyday Life.

  49. Stanley Benn and R. S. Peters

    Social Principles and the Democratic State (London: George Allen, 1959)

  50. Jonathan Bennett

    "The Necessity of Moral Judgements in Ethics 103, 1993, pp. 458-472.

  51. Fred R. Berger

    "Stevenson, Meaning and Metaethics" in Methodos 14, 1962.

  52. Frithjof Bergmann

    "The Experience of Values," Inquiry, Vol. 16, 1973.

  53. Luther J. Binkley

    Contemporary Ethical Theories(New York: Citadel, 1961)

  54. Robert Binkley

    The Ultimate Justification of Moral Rules" in Welsh, Fact, Value and Perception

  55. Rudiger Bittner

    What Reason Demands (Cambridge: C. U. P, 1989)

  56. Gunnar Björnsson

    "Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency" in Philosophical Studies 104, 2001

    Bjornsson takes emotivism as an empirical hypothesis identifying moral opinions with a certain kind of desire or optation. He then seeks to address the Frege-Geach problem by offering a rough general characterization of negative, conditional etc thoughts in terms of their functional role in reasoning and seeking to show what purposes can be served by optation-involving thoughts that play these functional roles.
    "How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Amoralists, Irrationality, and Depression" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 40, 2002.

  57. Max Black

    "Some Questions About Emotive Meaning" in Philosophical Review 57, 1948.
    "The Gap Between "is" and "Should"" in Philosophy 41, 1966.
    The Labyrinth of Language (Britannica Perspectives Series, London: Pall Mall, 1968) (esp. chap. 5 on emotivism)

  58. Robert Black

    Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism" in P.A.S. 30, 1989-90.

  59. Simon Blackburn

    "Moral Realism" in Casey, Morality and Moral Reasoning and in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 111-129.
    "Truth, Realism and the Regulation of Theory" in Midwest Studies 5, 1980
    "Rule-Following and Moral Realism" in Holzman and Leich, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, pp. 163-187.,
    Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

    This is a textbook in the philosophy of language. However the discussion of realism in chapters 5-7 is largely focused on the case of ethics and became the classic presentation of ethical irrealism in the 1980s. Blackburn sees evaluative properties as projections of sentiments and sets out to describe the quasi-realist project of explaining the realist character of the way we speak on the assumption that this projectivism is true. Central aspects of his sketch in chapter 6 of how this can be done include his influential treatment of the Frege-Geach problem, construing evaluative conditionals as expressive of second-order attitudes, and his ingenious attempt to make good projectivist sense of the matter of moral mind-independence. He also attempts to construct a notion of truth applicable to evaluations. The question, of how, if this quasi-realist project can give legitimate application to such realist language, the contrast with more robust realism should be made out, is addressed in chapter 7 in terms of the relevance of the subject matter of an area of discourse to the causal explanation of our beliefs in that area. Chapter 5 contains brief but interesting remarks on thick concepts, reductionism and the "speech act fallacy".

    "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value" in Honderich, , Morality and Moral Reasoning and in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 149-165.

    Considering Mackie's error theory, SB imagines that the error theorist might seek to engage in a form of practical thinking freed of metaphysical error - in shmoralizing. The error theory is undermined, however, if, as the quasi-realist expects, shmoralizing turns out to be just like moralizing. Hence the quasi-realist seek to accommodate the phenomenological aspects of value that the realist is apt to emphasize such as mind-independence. This is consistent with quasi-realism, however, as we can read the counterfactuals that state it as expressing first order moral commitments rather than as espousing metaethical realism. The analogy, pressed by McDowell, between values and secondary qualities, is questioned and, in the final section, SB suggests an affinity between projectivism and consequentialism.

    "Supervenience Revisited" in Hacking, Essays in Analysis and in Essays in Quasi-Realism.
    "Making Ends Meet" in Philosophical Books 1986.
    "Morals and Modals" in MacDonald and Wright, Fact, Science and Morality and in Essays in Quasi-Realism., pp. 52-74.
    "How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist" in Midwest Studies 12, 1987 and in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 166-181.
    "Attitudes and Contents" in Ethics 98, 1988, pp. 501-517 and in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 182-197.

    SB here revisits the Frege-Geach problem and seeks to improve on his STW approach. The general desideratum of any logic of attitudes is, he suggests, that our goals should be consistent. Taking a deontically perfect world to be one where every proposition we "hurrah!" is true and taking "H!p" where p is some proposition to express commitment to some goal to be realized in every deontically perfect world, "B!p" to rule p out of any such world, and "T!p" admit p to at least some deontically perfect worlds, we can understand the consistency of a set of attitude sentences in terms of whether they together commit us to a goal that can be consistently realized in some deontically perfect world. If this is not true we will say that the set of sentences is unsatisfiable. Negated attitudes can, SB suggests, be systematically read as attitudes to negated propositions, e.g. not-H!p = T!not-p. He understands conditionals and other basic embedded contexts in terms of what we are committed to when we accept something, adopting the method of semantic tableaux or trees to capture this notion. The commitment I express by e.g. "(H!p v H!q)" is one that involves tying myself to a tree. I tie myself, commit myself, to either accepting H!p or accepting H!q. The validity of an argument then consists in the joint unsatisfiability of the sentences we commit ourselves to in accepting the premises and denying the conclusion.

    "Just Causes" in Philosophical Studies 61, 1991, pp. 39-42 and in Essays in Quasi-Realism.
    "Reply to Sturgeon" in Philosophical Studies 61, 1991, pp. 39-42.
    "Through Thick and Thin" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 96, 1992.

    Blackburn sets out to debunk thick concepts arguing that the moral attitudes expressed in their use is typically carried by non-lexical features like tone, a matter of passing rather than priori theory. He stresses the flexibility of our language with respect to the evaluations we convey by it and our failure to talk past each other - at least as much as "thickies" should predict - when we bring contrasting sensibilities to the way we use our words.

    "Wise Feeling, Apt Reading" in Ethics 102, 1992
    Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993
    "Gibbard on Normative Logic" in Philosophical Issues 4, 1993, pp. 60-66.
    "The Land of Lost Content" in Frey and Morris, Va;lue, Welfare and Morality
    "Realism- Quasi or Queasy?" in Haldane and Wright, Reality, Representaion and Projection, pp. 365-383.
    "The Flight to Reality" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Virtues and Reasons.
    "Justification, Scepticism and Nihilism" in Utilitas 7, 1995.
    "Practical Tortoise Raising" in Mind, 1995
    "Dilemmas, Dithering, Plumping and Grief" in Mason, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory
    Review of Dworkin's "Objectivity and Truth", BEARS, 1996.
    "Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge
    "Has Kant Refuted Parfit?" in Dancy, Reading Parfit
    "Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 58, 1998
    Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)
    "Trust, Cooperation and Human Psychology" in Levi and Braithwaite, Trust and Governance, pp. 28-45.
    "Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism" in Mind 107, 1998, pp. 157-181.

    Objects to Wright's version of minimalism that there may be normative regimes for the acceptance/rejection of sentences that are nothing much to do with truth conditions. The proper moral to draw, SV argues, from the relvant work of Ramsey is that we need not a 'sorted notion of truth' but a sorted notion of truth-aptitude, one that recognizes functional differences. We can anyway rule out such distinctions in advance only if, unlike Wright but like Rorty we are accepting of an indefensibly quietist 'blanket miinimalism'. The second half of the paper is a critique of Wright and Boghossian's anxieties about the supposedly (and only supposedly, thinks SB) contagious character of irrealism about semantics.

    "Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?" in Inquiry 42, 1999, pp. 213-228.

    The quasi-realist is not greatly threatened by the freshman relativist.. The existence of alien and different moral views like those of the Taliban do not threaten it, do not deprive us of the conceptual resources to say, and say rightly, that such people are simply wrong (while granting to the freshman that there are other, very different viewpoints which we should be more tolerant of or from which we can even learn). It is rather quasi-realism.s rivals that are at risk from such a worry, given the likelihood of plural modes of human flourishing, plural ways in which people might constitute their practical identities and plural ways in which (à la McDowell/Cavell) our organisms might conceivably whirl. As for objectivity, it is a virtue, being sensitive to the right aspects of the situation, and in the right way and its opposite is bias, a vice the Taliban amply exemplify.

    "Relativism" in LaFollette, The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, pp. 38-52.
    "Normativity a la Mode" in The Journal of Ethics 5, 2001.
    "How Emotional is the Virtuous Person?" in Goldie, Understanding Emotions
    "Anti-Realist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism" in Copp, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, pp. 146-162.
    "Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?" in Dreier, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 144-159.

  60. William T. Blackstone

    "Objective Emotivism in Aesthetics" in Methodos 10, 1958.
    "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory and its Significance for Emotivism ni Contemporary Metaethics" in Methodos 11, 1959.
    "Can Science Justify an Ethical Code?" in Inquiry 3, 1960
    "Are Metaethical Theories Normatively Neutral?" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 39, 1961.
    "Science and Humanistic Ethics" in Indian Journal of Philosophy 3, 1961.
    "On Justifying a Metaethical Theory" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41, 1963.
    "Metaethics and Value Conflicts in Education" in Philosophy of Education 19, 1963.
    "Thomism and Metaethics" in Thomist 28, 1964.

  61. Brand Blanshard

    Reason and Goodness (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)

  62. Paul Bloomfield

    "Of Goodness and Healthiness: A Viable Moral Ontology" in Philosophical Studies 87, 1997
    "Prescriptions are Assertions: An Essay in Moral Syntax" in American Philosophical Quarterly 87, 1997.
    Moral Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
    "Is There Moral High Ground" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 41, 2003, pp. 511-526.
    "Opening Questions, Following Rules" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 169-189

  63. Lawrence Blum

    Moral Perception and Particularity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

  64. Paul Boghossian

    "The Rule-Following Considerations" in Mind 98, 1989.
    "The Status of Content" in Philosophical Review 99, 1990

  65. Paul Boghossian and David J. Velleman

    "Colour as a Secondary Quality" in Mind 98, 1989

  66. Sissela Bok

    "What Basis for Morality: A Minimalist Approach" in The Monist 76, 1993.

  67. E. J. Bond

    Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
    "The Justification of Moral Judgements" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification

  68. E. J. Borowski

    "Moral Autonomy Fights Back" in Philosophy 55, 1980.

  69. Luc Bovens and Dalia Drai

    "Supervenience and Moral Realism" in Philosophia 27, 1999.

  70. Norman E. Bowie

    (ed.)Ethical Theory (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1983)

  71. Dwight R. Boyd

    "An Interpretation of Principled Morality" in Journal of Moral Education 8, 1979.
    "The Return of Stage 6: Its Principle and Moral Point of View" in Wren, The Moral Domain
    "The Study of Moral Development: A Bridge over the Is-Ought Gap" in Wren, The Moral Domain

  72. Richard Boyd

    "How to be a Moral Realist" in Sayre-McCord, Essays on Moral Realism, pp. 181-228.

    This marvellous tour de force is the core paper of so-called Cornell Realism. Suppose we are homeostatic consequentialists . Suppose, that is, we identify goodness with a cluster of properties, conducive to the satisfaction of human needs, tending to occur together and with a tendency to promote each other (or to be promoted by the same sorts of things). If this theory is right, goodness is a natural property and as amenable to observation as any other. The role of heavily theory-laden intuition and culturally transmitted presuppositions need not debunk, just as in science it need not debunk. Indeed, in science, such things can be seen as favouring realism - we can argue that heavily theory-dependent revisions of scientific knowledge can only contribute to scientific progress if the theories in question are approximately true enough not to lead us astray. Analogously, if there is grounds to believe moral reasoning starts out approximately true, we can legitimately view the presupposition-heavy method of reflective equilibrium as one of discovery and not merely construction. And there is, argues RB, such ground: human needs are accessible to empircal study; indeed, he suggests, much moral progress has arisen from experiments of a political or social kind. And indeed our capacity to cognize our needs is highly apt for evolutionary explanation. As a natural kind term, "good" stands, on this view, in no need of any reductive, analytic definition. And as a term picking out a homeostatic cluster property we can predict failures of bivalence that can be explanatory of the intractability of moral "hard cases". What it would take to determine that this is what "good" meant would be grounds to believe this was the property that causally regulated our use of the word and Boyd thinks there may be such reasons - when for example we reflect on our we identify moral terms in foreign languages. Moreover externalism is true - we can, in principle, be well-informed about the moral facts and left indifferent to them. But the dual role of sympathy, as a cognitive aid to appreciating the needs of others and as a source of motivation makes this tend not to be the case. RB does not directly argue that homeostatic consequentialism is true. His aim is rather to use it for the illustrative purpose of characterizing how moral realism very plausibly might be defended.
    "Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 2003.
    "Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67, 2003.

  73. Joseph Boyle

    "Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001

  74. Michael Bradie

    "Rationality and the Objectivity of Values" in The Monist 67, 1984.

  75. M. S. Brady

    "How to Understand Internalism", Philosophical Quarterly 50, 2000

  76. Robert Brandom

    "Action, Norms and Practical Reasoning" in Philosophical Perspectives 12 1998

  77. R. B. Brandt

    "An Emotional Theory of the Judgment of Moral Worth" in Ethics 52, 1941
    "The Significance of Differences of Ethical Opinion for Ethical Relativism" in PPR 4 1944.
    "Moral Valuation" in Ethics 56 1946.
    "The Emotive Theory of Ethics" in Philosophical Review 59, 1950.
    "Stevenson's Defense of the Emotive Theory" in Philosophical Review 59, 1950
    "The Status of Empirical Assertion Theories in Ethics" in Mind 61, 1952.
    "The Definition of an Ideal Observer theory in Ethics" in PPR 15, 1954.
    "Some Puzzles for Attitude Theories of Value" in Lepley, The Language of Value.
    "Blameworthiness and Obligation" in Melden, Essays in Moral Philosophy.
    Ethical Theory (Prentice-Hall, 1959).
    "Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language" (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1963).
    "Rational Desires" in PAPA, 1970.
    A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979).
    "Relativism Refuted?" in The Monist 67, 1985, pp. 279-307.
    "The Explanation of Moral Language" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth.
    "Act Utilitarianism and Metaethics" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics.
    "The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in Ethics 100, 1990.
    "Foundationalism for Moral Theory" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics.
    "Science as a Basis for Moral Theory" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge.

  78. Jan Bransen

    "On the Incompleteness of McDowell's Moral Realism" in Topoi 21, pp. 187-198. 2002.

  79. Jan Bransen and Marc Slors

    (ed.) The Problematic Reality of Values (Van Gorcum: Assen, 1996)

  80. Michael Bratman

    "Intention and Evaluation" in Midwest Studies 10, 1986
    Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1987)
    "Cognitivism about Practical Reason" in Ethics 102, 1991, pp. 117-128 and in Faces of Intention.
    "Practical Reason and Acceptance in a Context. in Mind 101, 1992, pp. 1-14 and in Faces of Intention..
    "Identification, Decision and Treating as a Reason" in Philosophical Topics 24, 1996, pp. 1-18 and in Faces of Intention.
    "The Sources of Normativity" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, 1998 and in Faces of Intention.
    Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
    "Reflection, Planning and Temporally Extended Agency" in Philosophical Review 109, 2000, pp. 35-61.
    "Valuing and the Will" in Philosophical Perspectives 14, 2000, pp. 249-265.
    "Hierarchy, Circularity and Double Reduction". in Buss and Overton, Contours of Agency, pp. 65-85.
    "A Desire of One's Own" in Journal of Philosophy 100, 2003, pp. 221-242.

  81. J. M. Brennan

    The Open Texture of Moral Concepts(New York: Harper and Row, 1977)

  82. J. Bricke

    (ed.) Freedom and Morality (University of Kansas, 1976)

  83. M. H. Brighouse

    "Blackburn's Projectivism: An Objection" in Philosophical Studies 59, 1990, pp. 225-233.

  84. David O. Brink

    "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 1984.
    "Externalist Moral Realism" in Gillespie, Moral Realism, pp. 23-42.
    "Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17, 1987.
    "Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66, 1988.
    "Moral Realism Defended" in Pojman, Ethical Theory
    Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge:C.U.P., 1989).

    This is the only book-length exposition of what has come to be known as Cornell Realism. Brink thinks the anti-realist has the burden of proof in debate given the realist surface syntax of moral language, the realism he takes to be implicit in common sense morality and the fact that realism promises a "straight solution" to moral scepticism. He defends motivational externalism - the view that moral judgements motivate only contingently - by appealing to the possibility of the amoralist who views the moral facts with indifference. Moreover the coherence of the amoralist's sceptical challenge - that we give him a reason to care about morality - undermine, he urges, the distinct form of internalism whereby wherever there is a moral requirement there is a reason. So arguments such as Harman's against moral realism which depend on such internalism about reasons fail. Realism can make better sense than its rivals not only of the amoralist but also of moral disagreement, moral expertise and the possibility of an esoteric moral truth that, on moral grounds, it would be wrong for us to know. Brink defends a coherentist account of moral epistemology. He urges that we may, consistently with naturalism, agree with the claim of the 'Is'-'Ought' Thesis that there are no entailments between nonmoral statements and (nonvacuous) moral statements by rejecting what Brink calls the Semantic Test for Properties whereby terms designate the same property only if they are synonymous. This is false as familiar examples of synthetic property identities make clear. Given concerns about multiple realizability, moral naturalism is to be understood as a claim that moral properties are constituted by natural properties, not that they are identical to them. But there is nothing queer about constitution and because natural facts constitute the moral facts the latter are neither queer nor explanatorily impotent. Indeed Brink argues that moral facts do explanatory work in their own right not reducible to any lower-order explanations at the subvenient level. In a long final chapter Brink defends a version of objective utilitarianism. There are also several appendices of which the most interesting is a quite substantial discussion of Rawls' constructivism.

    "A Puzzle About the Authority of Morality" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
    "Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods" in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Social Philosophy and Policy 11, 1994.
    "Moral Conflict and Its Structure", Philosophical Review, 103, 1994.
    "A Reasonable Morality" in Ethics 104, 1994
    "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapibility, Authority and Supremacy" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
    "Moral Motivation" in Ethics 108, 1997, pp. 4-32.
    "Legal Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals
    "Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics" in Inquiry 42, 1999
    "Realism, Naturalism and Moral Semantics" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001

  85. C. D. Broad

    "On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics" in Ethics 1915.
    Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, 1930)
    "Is "Goodness" a Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?" in P.A.S.S., 1933-4.
    "Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics" in P.A.S. 45, 1945
    Ethics and the History of Philosophy (New York: Humantities Press, 1952)
    "Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore

  86. Dan Brock

    "The Justification of Morality" in American Philosophical Quarterly 14, 1979.

  87. Baruch Brody

    "Intuitions and Objective Moral Knowledge" in The Monist 62, 1979

  88. John Broome

    "Rational Choice and Value in Economics" in Oxford Economic Papers 30, 1978
    "Desire, Belief and Expectation" in Mind 100, 1991, pp. 265-267.
    ""Utility"" in Economics and Philosophy, 7 1991
    "Rationality and the sure-thing principle", in Meeks, Thoughtful Economic Man
    Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time, Blackwell, 1991. Paperback 1995.
    "Can a Humean be moderate?", in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality

    An important paper on practical reason. The extreme Humean claims there can be no rational constraints on preferences. The moderate Humean holds they are constrained only by coherence as modelled in the axioms of decision theory. However it is always possible to make any pattern of choice conform to these by fine-tuning the individuation of its objects, so, unless something constrains such fine-tuning, moderate Humeanism collapses into extreme Humeanism. This constraint, Broome argues, is provided by rational principles of indifference but to admit these is to leave Humeanism behind. The argument is backed up by remarks on the epistemology of preferences which is claimed essentially to involve judgements of the relative goodness of their objects.

    "Is incommensurability vagueness?" in Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang, Harvard University Press, 1997.
    "Reason and Motivation" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemetary Volume 71, 1997, pp. 131-146.

    Instrumentalism is false as it implies, absurdly, that if I want something I ought to want it. Rejecting instrumentalism, Broome suggests that reason can get us to conclusions about what we ought to do, to belief in normative propositions. But can it explain, and explain, in the right way, our coming to act on these propositions? Here Broome proposes we simply invoke a natural disposition to do what we believe we ought to do. Some might find this unsatisfying, objecting it does not explain our motivation in the right way, that it implies that "motivation is external to reason". But perhaps, Broome suggests, we should nonetheless accept this. At least unless some better account of practical reason - perhaps a noncognitivist account - can be found.

    "Extended preferences", in Fehige and Wessels, Preferences
    "Normative Requirements" in Ratio 12, 1999, pp. 398-421.

    Sometimes in virtue of some fact p one ought to do something, a strict relation we could write as: p oughts q. Sometimes a fact gives one a reason to do something, a slack relation: p reasons q. And sometimes a fact normatively requires one to do something: p requires q, another strict relation. If p and p oughts q then you ought to see to it that q. If p and p reasons q then you have a reason to q. But if p and p requires q it does not follow that you either ought or have a reason to see to it that q. Indeed normative requirements do not allow the detachment of a normative conclusion. Examples: believing that p normatively requires that I believe anything p entails; believing you ought to do something normatively requires doing it; and having an intention and a belief about the necessary means to realize it normatively requires intending the means. Instrumental reasoning then does not provide one with a reason to take the means the means to one's ends but merely requires it. So the argument of Korsgaard's "Normativity of Instrumental Reasons" fails.
    "Normative Practical Reasoning" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Supplementary Volume 75, 2001

  89. Bruce Brower

    "Virtue Concepts and Ethical Realism" in Journal of Philosophy 85, 1988.
    "Dispositional Ethical Realism" in Ethics, 103, 1993

  90. Erik Brown

    "Sympathy and Moral Objectivity" in American Philosophical Quarterly, 23, 1986

  91. S. C. Brown

    (ed.) Objectivity and Cultural Divergence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  92. A. Buchanan

    "Revisability and Rational Choice" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5, 1985.

  93. E. Bulygin, G. L. Gardies and I. Niiniluonto

    (eds.) Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life (Dordrecht: Reidl, 1985)

  94. John A. Burgess

    "Error Theories and Values" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76, 1998, pp. 534-552.

  95. Stephen L. Burton

    "Thick Concepts Revised" in Analysis 57, 1992
    "Reply to Garrard and McNaughton" in Analysis 58, 1993

  96. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton

    (Eds.) Contours of Agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge, Ma.: 2002)

  97. Panayot Butchvarov

    "Realism in Ethics" in Midwest Studies 12, 1988
    Skepticism in Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana Univeristy Press, 1989)
    "Ethics Dehumantized" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 367-389.

  98. Alex Byrne and Alan Hajek

    "David Hume, David Lewis and Decision Theory" in Mind 106, 1997

  99. C. A. Campbell

    "Moral and Non-Moral Values" in Mind 44, 1935

  100. Jay Campbell

    "Quine on Cognitive Meaning and Normative Ethics" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 34, 1996.

  101. Richmond Campbell

    "Can Inconsistency be Reasonable" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11, 1981
    "Sociobiology and the Possibility of Ethical Naturalism" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth
    "Socially Generated Moral Justifications" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification
    "Moral Epistemology" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2003.

  102. Claudia Card

    (Ed.):Feminist Ethics (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991)

  103. George R. Carlson

    "Moral Realism and Wanton Cruelty" in Philosophia 24, 1994.

  104. Thomas L. Carson

    "Gibbard's Conceptual Scheme for Moral Philosophy", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992
    Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2000)

  105. Thomas L. Carlson and Paul K. Moser

    "Relativism and Normative Nonrealism: Basing Morality on Rationality" in Metaphilosophy 27, 1996, pp. 277-295..

  106. Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet

    Response-Dependence, European Review of Philosophy. volume 3 (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998)

  107. John Casey

    (ed.) Morality and Moral Reasoning (London: Methuen, 1971)

  108. Hector-Neri Castaneda

    "On the Logic of Norms" in Methodos 9, 1957.
    "Imperatievs and Deontic Logic" in Analysis 19, 1958.
    "Imperative Reasonings" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21, 1960
    "Imperatives, Decisions and Oughts" in Catsaneda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
    Imperatives, Oughts and Moral Oughts" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44, 1966
    "Actions, Imperatives and Obligations" in Proceddings of the Aristotelian Society 68, 1968.
    "On the Conceptual Autonomy of Morality" in Nous 7, 1973.
    "'Ought' and 'Better'" in Analysis 34, 1973.
    Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975)
    "Normas, Imperativos y Hechos" in Critica 11, 1979.
    "Practical Thinking, Reasons for Doing and Intentional Action" in Theoria 2, 1987.

  109. Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian

    (eds.) Morality and the Language of Conduct (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963)

  110. Robert Cavalier, James Gouinlock and James Sterba

    Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

  111. Robert W. Chandler

    "A Revised Conception of Ethical Analysis" in Journal of Philosophy 16, 1954.

  112. Ruth Chang

    (ed.)Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard U.P. 1997)

  113. T. D. J. Chappell

    "The Incompleat Projectivist: How to be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist" in Philosophical Quarterly 48, 1998.

  114. David Charles and Kathleen Lennon

    (ed.) Reduction, Explanation and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

  115. Roderick Chisholm

    "Contrary to Duty Imperative and Deontic Logic" in Analysis 24, 1963

  116. Paul M. Churchland

    "Towards a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues" in Topoi 17, 1998.

  117. Stephen R. L. Clark

    "The Lack of Gap Between Fact and Value" in P.A.S.S. 58, 1980.
    "Mackie and the Moral Order" in Philosophical Quarterly 39, 1988.

  118. Stanley G. Clarke

    "Anti-Theory in Ethics" in American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1987

  119. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson

    (eds.)Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)

  120. Robert Coburn

    "Relativism and the Basis of Morality" in Philosophical Review 85, 1976
    "Morality, Truth and Relativism" in Ethics 92, 1982
    "A Defense of Ethical Noncognitivism." In Philosophical Studies 62, 1991.

  121. L. Jonathan Cohen

    "Three-Valued Ethics" in Philosophy 26, 1951.
    "Are Moral Arguments Always Liable to Break Down?" in Mind 68, 1959.

  122. Rachel Cohon

    "Are External Reasons Impossible" in Ethics 96, 1986
    "Internalism about Reasons for Action" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74, 1993.
    "The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 1997, pp. 827-850.

  123. Mark Colby

    "The Epistemological Foundations of Practical Reason" in Inquiry 42, 1999.

  124. John Collins

    "Belief, Desire and Revision" in Mind 97, 1988, pp. 333-342.

  125. Sarah Conly

    "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents" in American Philosophical Quartrly 22, 1985

  126. David E. Cooper

    "Moral Relativism" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978

  127. Neil Cooper

    The Diversity of Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
    "The Logical Respectability of Moral Judgements" in Inquiry 32, 1989

  128. David Copp

    "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form" in Ethics 92, 1982.
    "Considered Moral Judgements and Justification: Conservativism in Moral Theory" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth
    "Contractualism and Moral Scepticism" in Vallentyne, Contractualism and Rational Choice
    "Explanation and Justification in Ethics" in Ethics 100, 1990, pp.237-258.
    "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, Spindel Conference Supp. 29, 1991.
    "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms" in Ethics 101, 1991.
    "Moral Skepticism" in Philosophical Studies 62, 1991.
    "Reason and Needs", in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare, and Morality
    "The "Possibility" of a Categorical Imperative": Kant's Groundwork, Part III" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
    Morality, Normativity and Society (New York:Oxford University Press, 1995)
    "Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge
    "Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation" in Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics.
    "Belief, Reason and Motivation: Michael Smith's The Moral Problem" in Ethics, 108, 1997
    "The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason" in Social Philosophy and Policy 14, 1997
    "Milk, Honey and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth" in Synthese 124, 2000, pp. 113-137
    "Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001, pp. 1-43.
    "Against Internalism about Reasons - Gert's Rational Options" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, 2001.
    "Why Naturalism?" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6, 2003, pp. 179-200.
    (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

  129. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman

    (ed.) Morality, Reason and Truth (Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985)

  130. Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielsen

    (ed.) On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume XXI (1995) (Calgary: Calgary University Press, 1996)

  131. H. H. Cox

    "Warnock on Moore" in Mind 79, 1970.

  132. Roger Crisp

    "Naturalism and Non-Naturalism in Ethics" in Lovibond and Williams, Identity, Truth and Value
    "Particularising Particularism" in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, pp. 23-47.

  133. Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker

    (eds.)Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)

  134. Garrett Cullity

    "Aretaic Cognitivsm" in APQ 32, 1995.
    "Practical Theory" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
    "Particularism and Presumptive Reasons" in PASS 76, 2002, pp. 169-190.

  135. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut

    (eds.)Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)

  136. Terence Cuneo

    "An Externalist Solution to the Moral Problem" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 1999, pp. 359-380.
    "Are Moral Qualities Response-dependent?" in Nous 35, 2001
    "Reconciling Realism with Humeanism" in "Australasian Journal of Philosophy" 80, 2002, pp. 465-486.
    "Saying What we Mean: An Argument Against Expressivism" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 35-71.

  137. Jonathan Dancy

    "On Moral Properties" in Mind 90, 198, pp. 367-385.
    "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties" Mind (1983), pp. 530-47.
    "The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985.
    "Supererogation and Moral Realism" in Dancy, Moravcsik and Taylor, Human Agency
    "Two Conceptions of Moral Realism" in P.A.S.S. 60, 1986,pp. 167-188.
    "Intuitionism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics
    Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)
    "Why there is really no such thing as the theory of motivation", P.A.S. 95, 1995, pp. 1-1.
    "Arguments from Illusion", Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 1995.
    "In Defence of Thick Concepts" in Midwest Studies 20, 1995
    "Real Values in a Humean Context", Ratio, 1996.
    (ed.)Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)
    "Defending Particularism" in Metaphilosophy 30, 1999. pp. 25-32.
    "The Particularist's Progress" in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, pp. 130-156.
    Practical Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000
    "Wht Do Reasons Do?" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 41, 2003 (Supp), pp. 95-113
    "Enticing Reasons" in Wallace, Pettit, Scheffler and Smith, Reason and Value.
    Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
    "On the Importance of Making Things Right" in Ratio 17, 2004, pp. 229-237.
    "Nonnaturalism" in Copp, Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, pp. 121-144.
    "What Reasons Do" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 39-59.

  138. Jonathan Dancy, J. Moravcsik and C. C. W. Taylor

    (Eds.)Human Agency: Language, Duty, Value (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985)

  139. Norman Daniels

    (Ed.)Reading Rawls (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975)
    "Moral Theory and the Plasticity of Persons" in The Monist 62, 1979.
    "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics in JP 76, 1979.
    "Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, 1980.
    Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics" in Philosophical Studies 37, 1980
    "Can Cognitive Psychotherapy Reconcile Reason and Desire?" in Ethics93 1983
    "Two Approaches to Theory Acceptance in Ethics" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth

  140. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson

    "Expressivism, Morality and the Emotions" in Ethics 104 1994.
    "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, 2000, pp. 65-89.
    "Sentiment and Value" in Ethics 110, 2000, pp. 722-748.
    "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (or, Anti-Quasijudgementalism)" in Hatzimoysis, Philosophy and the Emotions.
    "Two Arguments for Sentimentalism" in Philosophical Issues 15, 2005, pp. 1-25.
    "Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 99-126.
    Sensibility Theory and Projection" in Copp, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

  141. Stephen Darwall

    "Harman and Moral Relativism," in The Personalist 58, 1977.
    "Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Actions" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, 1978
    Impartial Reason (London: Cornell U.P., 1983)

    In this rich and interesting exploration of a Kantian approach to practical reason in general and moral reasons in particular, Darwall sets out first of all to loosen the supposed links between reasons and desires. Desires as such do not furnish us with reasons. Reasons must be capable of motivating us all right but what can be a reason for me depends not on my present desires but on my motivational capacities in a broad sense. Reasons, Darwall maintains, are facts reflective awareness of which would move us to action. Where preferences conflict we face a problem of integration, one that demands we adopt a standpoint distinct from that internal to any individual preference, a reflective standpoint whence we may dispassionately adjudicate among preferences. The unity of agency we can thereby attain is made possible by our taking preferences to be criticizable in the light of reasons. Some of our reasons comprise objective considerations, considerations that make no reference to the agent as such. A preference is impersonally basable if it can be motivated by objective considerations. Reasons are intersubjective when they involve considerations that might ground impersonally basable pereference for all members of some community. It is a fact about us - and not a mysterious nonnatural one - that we prefer our preferences to be impersonal basable, that we value intersubjectivity in our values. Our capacity for self-repect is bound up with notions of intersubjective respect-worthiness. Intersubjective value also informs our understanding of our welfare as something that matters and should matter to ourselves and others and of our lives as meaningful. Crucially it also informs the practice of rational appraisal which makes reference to norms taken as applicable to all agents. An internally self-identified subject of a system of rational norms is proximally motivated by the desire to act on the rational principles he recognizes but this desire in turn is motivated (and justified) by judgements about intersubjectively valid normative principles. We may think of such principles as those that would be chosen from behind a think veil of ignorance. The book contains useful discussions of, inter alia, Nagel, Gauthier and Baier.

    "Kantian Practical Reason Defended" in Ethics 96, 1985.
    "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out" in Philosophical Studies 50, 1986
    "Rational Agent, Rational Act" in Philosophical Topics 14, 1986
    "Abolishing Morality" in Synthese 72, 1987.
    "How Nowhere Can You Get (and Do Ethics)?" in Ethics 98, 1987
    "Moore to Stevenson", in Cavalier, Gouinlock and Sterba, Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy.
    "Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals" in Nous 24, 1990.
    "Internalism and Agency" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
    THe British Moralistis and the Internal 'Ought' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
    "Reasons, Motives and the Demands of Morality" in Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, Moral DIscourse and Practice
    "Reason, Norm and Value" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society
    "Expressivist Relativism" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 58, 1998.
    Philosophical Ethics (Boulder: Westview, 1998)
    "Because I Want It" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
    "Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem" in Stratton-Lake, Ethical Intuitionism.
    "Moore, Normativity and Intrinsic Value" in Ethics 113, 2003, pp. 468-489.
    "How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy: Moore's Legacy" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 17- 37.

  142. Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard and Peter Railton

    "Towards Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends" in Philosophical Review 101, 1992, pp. 115-189.

  143. Donald Davidson

    .How is Weakness of the Will Possible?. in Feinberg (ed.): Moral Concepts.

    Reflection on the structure of moral conflict and weakness show that we should not treat moral principles as universally quantified conditionals since the instantiation of the antecedent does not permit the detachment of the consequent. Rather we should construe such principles as denoting a relation between propositions along the lines of .x is F prima facie makes x right/good. (.pf(x is right/good, x is F).). That (a is right/wrong, e) where e is all the considerations known to the agent is never logically entailed by any more particular prima facie principle instantiated by a. Nor does it entail the unconditional judgement .x is good/right.. Weakness of will is what occurs when I judge that pf(x is better than y, e) but I am led irrationally by some subset of e to the unconditional judgement (y is better than x) which issues in clear-eyed akratic action.
    Expressing Evaluations The Lindley Lecture (monograph), University of Kansas, 1984.
    "The Objectivity of Values" in Gutiérrez (ed): El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (Reprinted in English and Serbo-Croatian translation in: Belgrade Circle 1-2, 1995).
    "Objectivity and Practical Reasoning" in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.): Reasoning Practically

  144. Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone

    "Two Notions of Necessity" in Philosophical Studies 38, 1980

  145. William H. Davis

    "The Authority of the Moral Sense" in Journal of Value Inquiry 13, 1979.
    "The Morally Obvious" in Journal of Value Inquiry 19, 1985.

  146. Judith Wagner DeCew

    "Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism" in Ethics 101, 1990.

  147. Michael De Paul

    "Reflective Equilibrium and Foundationalism" in American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 1986.
    "Supervenience and Moral Dependence" in Philosophical Studies 23, 1987.
    "Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics" in Mind 96, 1987.
    "Argument and Perception: The Role of Literature in Moral Inquiry" in Journal of Philosophy 85, 1988.
    "The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, 1988.
    "The Highest Moral Knowledge and the Truth Behind Internalism" in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spindel Supplement, 199, pp. 137-165.
    Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1993)

  148. Elliot Deutsch

    (ed.) Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989)

  149. John Dewey

    Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt, 1922)
    "The Ambiguity of "Intrinsic Good" in Journal of Philosophy 39, 1942.
    "Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality" in Journal of Philosophy 40, 1943.
    "Further as to Valuation as Judgment" in Journal of Philosophy 40, 1943.
    "Some Questions about Value" in Journal of Philosophy 41, 1944.
    "Ethical Subject-Matter and Language" in Journal of Philosophy 42, 1945

  150. John Divers and Alexander Miller

    "Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth" in Analysis 54, 1994.

    There is, as Michael Smith claims, an analytic link between truth and belief. But, as his account of the distinct functional roles of belief and desire is not platitudinous and is disputed by anti-Humeans, minimalists need not accept it. So Smith cannot argue from moral beliefs not being even minimally beliefs to their not being minimally true for he is not entitled to that premise. Nor from their not being robustly beliefs to their not being minimally true for the analytic link supports no valid such argument. If his claim is that moral language is only minimally true but not robustly true that may be consistent with Wright's minimalism which is pluralistic about truth. Perhaps Smith is objecting to the claim that moral language is assertoric but then he needs to supply and argument against the claim that being minimally truth-apt suffices for being assertoric.
  151. Julian Dodd and Suzanne Stern-Gillet

    "The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Dialogue 34, 1995

  152. Marinus C. Doeser

    "Can the Dichotomy of Fact and Value be Maintained?" in Doeser and Kraay, Facts and Values

  153. Marinus C. Doeser and John N. Kraay

    (Eds.)Facts and Values: Philosophical Reflections from Western and Non-Western Perspectives (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986)

  154. Alan Donagan

    The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977)
    "Moral Rationalism and Variable Social Institutions" in Midwest Studies 7, 1982

  155. Cian Dorr

    "Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking" in Nous 36, 2002, pp. 558-572.

    This paper considers arguments of the form: 1. P 2. If P then Q Therefore: 3. Q where P is an evaluative sentence and Q a straightforwardly factual sentence. Suppose someone who accepts 2 comes to accept 1. This, we naturally think, can make it rationally appropriate to come to accept 3. But to do so, if 1 is given a noncognitivist interpretation, would be a case of wishful thinking: revising one's beliefs about the world in the interest of making them cohere with our desires and feelings. And that is never rationally appropriate. So a charitable approach to what we are naturally disposed to think demands that we reject noncognitivism.

  156. Dale Dorsey

    "A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics" in Philosophical Studies 127, 2006, pp. 493-523.

  157. R. S. Downie

    "The Hypothetical Imperative" in Mind 93, 1984

  158. James Dreier

    "Internalism and Speaker Relativism" in Ethics 101, 1990, pp. 6-26.

    This important paper defends a form of relativism where "x is good" is taken to mean "x is approved by some standard M" where this standard is determined contextually. Foot-type constraints on what can count as a moral standard are one determining factor here but more central are the motivational/affective dispositions of the speaker so that normally, there is a conceptual linkage between one's moral beliefs and such dispositions. Dreier defends this modest internalism - "the principle that in normal contexts a person has some motivation to promote what he believes to be good". When stated in this modest way, he urges, internalism retains its plausibility but evades the sorts of counterexamples suggested by e.g. Stocker. Speaker relativism is defended as furnishing the best explanation of modest externalism (the main rivals here being Michael Smith's moral sense theory which has problems when the speaker's moral beliefs are false and noncognitivism which remains plagued by the embedding problem).

    "The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism", Southern J Phil 30.

    Dreier argues that, while Blackburn is right is supposing that for the moral dualist (nonnaturalist realist) the supervenience of the moral on the natural is left mysterious, his supervenience argument against realism is question begging against reductive naturalism (for reductive naturalists accept strong supervenience) and is unsuccessful against nonreductive naturalists who have no trouble accepting weak and rejecting strong supervenience. At least they will reject strong supervenience when the latter is read as claiming that whenever a thing is M (where M is some moral predicate) it is analytically necessary that anything N is M (where N is some natural predicate). (If it were a case of metaphysical necessity rather than analytic necessity nonreductive naturalists would hold strong supervenience true and so, Dreier claims, they should.) However, Dreier goes on to argue, his own favoured indexical account of moral concepts, whereby these are understood as expressing properties relative to contexts of utterance, makes excellent sense of moral supervenience which operates in strikingly similar ways to the supervenience relations between indexical and non-indexical predicates.
    "Structures of Normative Theories", Monist 76, 1993.
    "Perspectives on the Normativity of Ethics", Nous 28(1994) 514-525.
    "Accepting Agent-Centered Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It"in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 1996.
    "Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth" Philosophical Studies, 83, 1996

    Horwich and Stoljar have argued that truth-minimalism puts us in the way of a quick and dirty solution to the Frege-Geach problem. JD isn't having it, urging that expressivists must, as Blackburn puts it, earn the right to talk of even minimal truth by explaining how the various embedded contexts make sense on an expressivist reading of the embedded expressions. If we adopt a minimalist take on truth-conditions, knowing the truth conditions of moral claims doesn't suffice for this. JD's illustration: Stipulate that "Bob is hiyo" º "Hiyo [i.e. Hi!], Bob!". This gives us embeddability and hence minimal truth. But we are still no distance towards making sense of "If a dingo is near, then Bob is hiyo." And merely to appeal here to the inference rule for the conditional is not much help.

    "Rational Preference: Decision theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality" Theory and Decision, 40, 199, 249-276.
    "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality" in Gaut and Cullity, Ethics and Practical Reason

    It is false that there are no categorical imperative. The means-end rule: M/E -If you desire to F and believe that by Ging you will F, then you ought to G is one. Someone who failed to follow this rule would be irrational and what they are missing cannot be a desire: a desire to comply with M/E would only be any help if they were already disposed to do so. Dreier calls this the Tortoise argument given the analogy with Carroll's famous argument: we can't get someone who doesn't accept the validity of an instance of modus ponens to do so by getting them to accept more conditionals. Means/end rationality then has a special status: nothing could even count as a reason for someone who did not buy into it. But this special status is significant since instrumental reasons do seems always to be dependent on our contingent desires and the Tortoise argument gives us grounds to suppose that instrumental reasons are fundamental.
    "Transforming Expressivism" in Nous 33, 1999.

    Dreier first proposes a way of representing Gibbard's semantics from Wise Choices that treats content of a statement S as a function from systems of norms to sets of worlds specified as follows:
    {<n, W>: Sn holds at w « w Î W}
    where Sn is the descriptive correlate, Gibbard-style, of S (obtained by replacing every normative predicate in S with its n-corresponding predicate, forbidden/permitted/required according to n). This is a function from systems of norms to propositions construed as per possible worlds semantics. But it can be generalized to view the content of a statement as a function from systems of norms to propositions construed in other ways. This way of formulating Gibbard's semantics makes it tractable for relatively fine-grained ways of individuating propositions and casts light on what is meant by calling a normative statement "true". However, JD goes on to suggest, this sort of expressivism, is starting to look very close to a form of cognitivism, one where normative statements are seen as having definite propositional content, where this is determined by the meaning of the statement (again a function from norms to propositions) and whichever norms are salient in its conversational content.

    "Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 2000

    Michael Smith says that if externalism is true we must conceive of good people either as motivated by a de re desire to do the right thing or a de dicto desire to do the right thing. The first would fail the tracking condition: such a desire would not be properly responsive to changes in moral beliefs. The second would be "fetishistic". Dreier argues this dilemma does not exhaust the possibilities. First, an agent might just be suggestible: changes in moral belief might just cause appropriate changes in de re desires. The suggestible agent however might still be morally defective for her motivation would not meet a variant of the tracking condition: her response to moral uncertainty might be defective, involving a reluctance to investigate moral arguments that might lead her to change her mind. Second an agent might have an effective second-order desire to come to desire noninstrumentally and de re to do the right thing. The resultant first order desire would be contingent on the second order desire in that the former would owe its existence to the latter. But the first order desire need not be conditioned on the second order desire in the sense that would make it instrumental. So Smith's argument by dilemma against externalism fails.

    "The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, 2002.

    The expressivist analysis of normative judgements invokes ascriptions of beliefs and desires. But it is widely held that belief and desire are themselves normative concepts. If someone fears dogs they ought to flee them. If someone believes that P & Q they ought to believe that Q & P. This renders expressivism circular insofar as it seeks to explain normativity. Blackburn tries to 'de-fang' the worry by suggesting that in ascribing beliefs and desires we express "expectations" but without regarding these expectations as normative. This understates the problem as (1) the "ought" in talk of what we ought to believe seem paradigmatically normative; (2) the normative aspects of belief and desire seem to belong to them constitutively. JD's proposed solution is to exploit the way we can stand back from norms, speaking e.g. of 'so-called virtues'. What he proposes the expressivist should say is that: "Saying what people ought to do expresses a so-called desire that such things be done."
    "Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment" in Philosophical Issues 12, pp. 241-263.
    "Troubling Developments in Metaethics" (Critical Study of Timmons, Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism in Nous 36, 2002
    "Metaethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism" in PHilosophical Perspectives 18. 2004, pp. 23-44.
    (ed.): Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006)
    "Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 217-233.
    "Was Moore a Moorean?" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 191-217.

  159. Elmer H. Duncan

    "Has Anyone Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy?" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 8, 1970.

  160. A. E. Duncan-Jones

    "Good Things and Good Thieves" in Analysis 17, 1966.

  161. Michael Durrant and Robin Attfield

    "Prescriptivity and Justification" in Philosophical Papers 10, 1980.

  162. R. G. Durrant

    "Moral Neutrality and the Analysis of Morality" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 36 1958.
    "Identity of Property and the Definition of Good" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48, 1970.

  163. Gerald Dworkin
  164. "Contractualism and the Normativity of Principles" in Ethics 112, 2002, pp. 471-482.

    An excellent short paper on Scanlon which argues that Scanlon's invocation of considerations of justifiability to others need not leave all the work to be done by independent considerations which explain them. There might indeed be such independent considerations but for a Scanlonian contractualism, what would remain distinctive about considerations of justificability of others would be their providing moral principles with their normative authority. They hypothetical character of the justification to which contractualism appeals does not undermine this authority so long as we share the ideal of human relationship to which the theory appeals. However Dworkin raises a different set of sceptical worry addressed to Scanlon's claim that moral reasons somehow apply even to those (the disaffected) who do not share this ideal.

  165. Gerald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson

    Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1968)

  166. Ronald Dworkin

    "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 25, 1996, pp. 87-139.

  167. Susan Dwyer

    "Moral Competence" in Murasugi and Stainton (eds.):Philosophy and Linguistics

  168. Roy Edgley

    Reason in Theory and Practice (London: Hutchinson, 1969)

  169. Jon Elster and J. E. Roemer

    (eds.) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

  170. David Enoch
  171. "Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson" in Ratio 14, 2001

    FJ claims that if someone believes that p and that if p then q then he ought to believe that q. The noncognitivist will accept this normative claim but may deny that, as a matter of conceptual truth, being subject to such a norm is a constitutive condition for being a belief. He may instead offer a nonnormative characterization of beliefs in terms of certain dispositions. In this way a noncognitivist can sidestep Jackson's argument (in the latter's "Noncognitivism, Normativity, Belief").

    "Why Idealize?" in Ethics 155, 2005, pp. 759-787.
    "Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What is Constitutive of Action" in Philosophical Review 115, 2006, pp. 169-198

    A sharp and forceful paper urging against Rosati, Velleman and Korsgaard that the fact that some aim is constitutive of action does nothing by itself to endow it with normative significance for the agent.

    "AN Outline of An ARgument for Robust Metanormative Realism in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2, pp. 21-50.

  172. A. C. Ewing

    "Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics" in Mind 53, 1944.
    "The Possibility of an Agreed Ethics" in Philosophy 21, 1946.
    The Definition of Good (New York: MacMillan, 1947).
    "Hare and the Universalisation Principle" in Philosophy 39, 1964.
    "The Autonomy of Ethics" in Ramsey, The Prospect of Metaphysics.

  173. W. D. Falk:

    ""Ought" and Motivation" in P.A.S. 48, 1947-8 and Ought, Reasons and Morality
    "Moral Perplexity" in Ethics 66, 1956
    "Action-Guiding Reasons" in Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963
    "Morality, Self and Others in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
    "Hume on Practical Reason" in Philosophical Studies 27, 1975
    "Hume on "Is" and "Ought" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6, 1976
    Ought, Reasons and Morality (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1990).

  174. Jeremy Fantl

    "Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, 2006, pp. 24-44.

  175. Christoph Fehige

    (ed.)Zum moralischer Denken (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995)

  176. Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels

    (eds.)Preferences (de Gruyter, 1998)

  177. Joel Feinberg
  178. (ed.): Moral Concepts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969)

  179. Hartry Field

    "Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse" in Philosophical Review 103, 1994.

  180. J. N. Findlay

    Values and Intentions (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)

  181. Kit Fine

    "The Question of Realism" in Philosophers' Imprint 1, 2001.

  182. Stephen Finlay

    “The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement” in Journal of Ethics 8, 2004, pp. 205-223.
    “Value and Implicature” in Philosophers’ Imprint 5, 2005.
    “The Reasons that Matter” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, 2006 pp. 1-20.
    "Responding to Normativity" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2, pp. 220-239.

  183. Roderick Firth

    "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12, 1952, pp. 317-345.

  184. Mark Fisher

    "On the Logical Status of Metaethical Theories" in Theoria 28, 1962.

  185. William J. Fitzpatrick

    "The Practical Turn In Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity" in Ethics 115, 2005, pp. 651-691.

  186. Owen Flanagan

    "Moral Structures?" in Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12, 1982.
    "Virtue, Sex and Gender: Philosophical Reflections on the Moral Psychology Debate" in Ethics 92, 1982.
    "A Reply to Lawrence Kohlberg's 'Puka-Goodpaster Exchange'" in Ethics 92, 1982.
    "Quinean Ethics" in Ethics 93, 1982, pp. 56-74.
    "Pragmatism, Ethics and Correspondence Truth: Response to Gibson and Quine" in Ethics 98, 1988.
    "Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation" in Flanagan and Rorty, Identity, Character and Morality.
    Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
    Self-Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

  187. Owen Flanagan and Amelie O. Rorty

    (Eds.)Identity, Character and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1990).

  188. Philippa Foot

    "Moral Beliefs" in P.A.S. 59, 1958 and Virtues and Vices

    Two assumptions typically inform the rejection of naturalism: (1) "some individual may, without logical error, base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no one else would recognize as giving any evidence at all." and (2) "given the kind of statement which other people regard as evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw the conclusion because this does not count as evidence for him." Both (1) and (2) are false, Foot argues, for there is an internal relation between evaluations and their objects. Similar points apply to an attitude like pride or a judgement like the judgement that something is dangerous. You can't be proud of just anything (of the sky, say) or think dangerous something quite unconnected with injury (and similarly not just anything can count as an injury). To say some action is good, in a moral context, is to bring it under the head of some duty or virtue and some actions (like clasping ones hands three times in an hour) have no such connection - at least absent some special background. Nothing can be counted a virtue if not connected with human good or harm. Judgements about moral goodness have an action-guiding character because of the sorts of things that are good. Thus we have a reason to pursue courage and temperance because of the sorts of things they are, because they speak to human needs. Having the virtues benefits the possessor. It is hard, Foot concedes, to show that justice is a benefit to its possessor but only if this can be done (and she thinks it can) can we count justice a virtue at all.

    "Moral Arguments" in Mind 67, 1958 and Virtues and Vices.

    Foot denies the view that moral arguments are liable to breakdown where the disputants simply take opposing attitudes such that no appeal to evidence can gain purchase on the position of either. "Anyone who uses moral terms at all... must abide by the rules for their use, including rules about what shall count as evidence for or against the moral judgement concerned." She begins with a consideration of "rude". Something is rude is it "causes offence by indicating lack of respect". It may be used to condemn but can be used only when certain descriptive conditions apply. Someone couldn't just decide it was rude to act conventionally or approach a front door slowly. Likewise notions like goodness, obligation, virtue are conceptually tied to notions of harms, benefit, advantage: "a man cannot make his own personal decision about the considerations which are to count as evidence in morals." And the concept of "morality" itself is tied down to certain aspects of our practice. This is not to support a "verbal decision in favour of our own moral code". For we can accept with Foot that moral concepts have descriptive anchorings while at the same time being open to the possibility that conventional morality may be subverted by argument. Such openness to argument is consistent with a recognition that there are constraints on what are to count as arguments.

    "Goodness and Choice" in P. A. S. S. 35, 1961 and Virtues and Vices
    (ed.)Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967)
    "Morality and Art " in Proceedings of the British Academy, 56, 1970.
    "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in Philosophical Review 81, 1972 and Virtues and Vices.
    Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978)
    "Moral Relativism" (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1979)
    "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma" in Journal of Philosophy 80, 1983.
    "Utilitarianism and the Virtues" in Mind 94, 1985.
    "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, 1995

    Subjectivists hold that there is some special essentially practical way of using language that characterizes moral language. Given this there is necessarily always a gap between the descriptive grounds of a moral judgement and the judgement itself. This supposition is the mistake Foot.s title refers to. What makes it plausible is .Hume.s practicality requirement., that morality is essentially practical. Foot accepts this requirement but thinks its demand is best met simply by taking morality to be part of practical reasons. That is an unattractive view if practical rationality is conceived as grounded in an agent.s desires; but she claims, following Quinn, that it should not be so conceived. Rather practical rationality concerns the goodness of human beings with respect to action where this is conceived as depending on essential features of human life. Given these facts of human life (what, following Anscombe, Foot calls Aristotelian necessities) considerations of e.g. the honouring of promises can be connected to action, as Hume.s requirement demands, by acquiring the status of practical reasons. These are reasons every individual has though there is no requirement that every individual should recognize them.
    "Rationality and Virtue" in Pauer-Studer (ed): Norms, Values, and Society
    The rationality of moral action should not be understood in terms of some independently conceived notion of rationality in terms of self-interest or desire. Rather, something, justice say, being a virtue just is for it to consist in sensitivity to a certain range of reasons. The central question here will then be whether some candidate virtue really is a virtue and we answer it by inquiring whether actions that accord with it are good human actions. And this, Foot argues, is something we ascertain by consideration of the way of life of our species and our characteristic needs if we are to flourish.
    .
  189. Eckart Forster

    (Ed.): Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The "Three Critiques" and the "Opus Postumum" (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1989)

  190. Bas C. van Fraasen

    "Values and the Heart's Command" ni Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973.

  191. W. Frankena

    "The Naturalistic Fallacy" in Mind 48, 1939.

    This is not the supposed fallacy of inferring 'ought's from 'is's but that of thinking 'good' can be defined. For Moore, naturalists commit what WF calls the definist fallacy of defining one property by another. But if this were generally fallacy all definition would be impossible. It is a fallacy only where the properties in question are indeed distinct. It is precisely this that is at issue between naturalists and intuitionists so the latter cannot appeal to the supposed fallacy from the outset as a weapon in controversy but only after the issue is settled. And if the intuitionist proves right, the mistake of which naturalists stand convicted is that of confusing two properties, or perhaps of blindness to one of them. These are both mistakes, certainly, but not logical fallacies, properly speaking.

    "Ewing's Case Against Naturalistic Theories of Value" in Philosophical Review 57, 1948.
    "Arguments for Non-Naturalism about Intrinsic Value" in Philosophical Studies 1, 1950.
    "Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century" in Philosophical Review 60, 1951
    "Sellars' Theory of Valuation" in PPR 15, 1954
    "Ethical Naturalism Renovated" in Review of Metaphysics 10 1957
    "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy" in A. I. Melden, Essays in Moral Philosophy, pp. 40-81.
    "Broad's Analysis of Ethical Terms" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of C. D. Broad.
    Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963)
    "Recent Conceptions of Morality" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
    "On Saying the Ethical Thing" in P. A. P. A. 39 1966.
    Perspectives on Morality: Essays of William K. Frankena (ed. Kenneth Goodpaster)(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976)
    "Is Morality a Purely Personal Matter?" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978
    "Is Morality a System of Ordinary Oughts?" in The Monist 63, 1980
    "Has Morality an Independent Bottom?" in The Monist 63, 1980
    "Concepts of Rational Actions in the History of Ethics" in Social theory and Practice 9, 1983
    "Moral-Point-of-View Theories" in Bowie, Ethical Theory
    "Hare on the Levels of Moral Thinking" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
    "Hare on Moral Weakness and the Definition of Morality" in Ethics 98, 1988.
    "Kantian Ethics Today" in Journal of Philosophical Research 15, 1990

  192. Samuel Freeman

    (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

  193. R. G. Frey and C. W. Morris

    (Ed.) Value, Welfare and Morality (Cambridge, C. U. P. 1993)

  194. Richard Fumerton

    Reason and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990)

  195. W. B. Gallie

    "Essentially Contested Concepts" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, 1956
    "Essentially Contested Concepts" in Inquiry 14, 1994

  196. Eric H. Gampel

    "A Defense of the Autonomy of Ethics: Why Value Is Not Like Water" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, 1996.

    A very nice critique of naturalism. It's often thought the Open Question Argument is evaded by forms of naturalism that propose a synthetic a posteriori identity between goodness and some natural property, much as we find with natural kind terms. But natural kind terms are rather special. With them, speakers intend to refer to whatever is actually causally responsible for whatever phenomona 'fix the reference' . So this question is not open: "X has a high M[ean] K[inetic] E[nergy] and having such an MKE is what explains all the causal roles of high temperature in the actual world..., but is X hot?" In ethics however speakers do not have such intentions. So this question is open: "A is N and being N is what explains the causal role of right acts in the actual world..., but is A right?" If the naturalist says he is offering reforming definitions we should plausibly reject these on ethical grounds. These questions should remain open. Causal.explanatory role is not what we should appeal to in determining the answers to ethical questions

    "Ethics, Reference and Natural Kinds" in Philosophical Papers 26 1997

  197. J. L. A. Garcia

    "On 'Justifying' Morality" in Metaphilosophy 17, 1986
    "Relativism and Moral Divergence" in Metaphilosophy 19, 1988
    "On the Irreducibility of the Will" in Synthese 1991
    "Are 'Is' to 'Ought' Deductions Fallacious: On a Humean Formal Argument" in Argumentation 9, 1995

  198. Richard T. Garner

    "On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68, 1990, pp. 137-146.
    Beyond Morality Philadelpia: Temple University Press, 1994)

  199. Eve Garrard and David McNaughton

    "Thick Concepts Revisited: A Reply to Nurton" in Analysis 53, 1993
    "Mapping Moral Motivation" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1, 1998, pp. 267-291.

  200. Jon Garthoff

    "The Embodiment Thesis" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7, 2004, pp. 15-29.

  201. Gerald Gaus

    Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990) Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay On Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)

  202. Berys Gaut

    "The Structure of Practical Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason

  203. David Gauthier

    Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962)
    "Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy" in American Philosophical Quarterly 4, 1967.
    "The Unity of Reason: A Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant" in Ethics 96, 1985.
    Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
    "Reason to be Moral?" in Synthese 72, 1987.
    "Moral Artifice" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, 1988.
    "Morality, Social Choice and Semantic Representation: A Reply to My Critics" in Social Philosophy and Policy 5, 1988.
    Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics and Reason(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
    "The Roots and Roles of Normative Governance" in Synthese 91, 1992.
    "Value, Reasons and the Sense of Justice" in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality.
    "Assure and Threaten" in Ethics 104, 1994
    "Individual Reason" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society. "Rationality and the Rational Aim" in Dancy, Reading Parfit
    "Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins" in Fehige, Preferences.

  204. R. Gay

    "Bernard Williams on Practical Necessity" in Mind 98, 1984

  205. Peter Geach

    "Good and Evil" in Analysis 17, 1956

    "Good" is always attributive never predicative. I.e "is a good A" does not decompose logically into "is an A" and "is good". Failure to see this leads to error. Thus "Objectivists", seeing the difficulty in understanding "good" as a descriptive predicative adjective, imagine it might somehow help to see it as a descriptive predicative adjective standing for non-natural property. And "Oxford Moralists" see it as not descriptive at all but commendatory. It is a fallacy to think that this makes "good" ambiguous. There is a connection, and not an empirical one, between goodness and choice but it is one that holds normally and other things being equal. Normally and other things being equal someone who wants an A will choose a good A -this is part of the "ratio" of "want". The case of good action is special because this is something at which everyone aims. Without contextual clue as to what substantive is intended talk of "good things" or "good events" is just unintelligible.

    "Imperative and Deontic Logic" in Analysis 18, 1957-8 and in Logic Matters
    "Ascriptivism" in Philosophical Review 69, 1960 and in Logic Matters

    Ascriptivism is the view that calling an action voluntary is not to describe it at all but to ascribe it to some person, holding that person responsible for it. Geach thinks this representative of a fashion for reading apparently descriptive uses of language as nothing of the kind, another such being prescriptivism. Such non-descriptive theories offer accounts of what it is to call something P, but collapse when we consider cases where we predicate P of something without calling it P as we do in embedded contexts such as "If gambling is bad, inviting people to gamble is bad." A quite separate story might be told about what "bad", "voluntary" or whatever mean in such contexts but then modus ponens arguments in whch such conditionals feature would be convicted of equivocation. And so the "Frege-Geach" argument against expressivism is born.

    "Imperative Inference" in Analysis 23, Supplement, 1963 and in Logic Matters
    "Assertion" in Philosophical Review 74, 1965, pp. 449-465 and in Logic Matters
    "Kenny on Practical Reasoning" in Analysis 26, 1966
    Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972 & Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)
    The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)
    (ed.)Logic and Ethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991)
    "Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic?" in Logic and Ethics

  206. George R. Geiger

    "Can We Choose Between Values?" in Journal of Philosophy 41, 1944.
    "A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Philosophy of Science 16, 1949.

  207. Harry J. Gensler

    "The Prescriptivism Incompletness Theorem", in Mind, 1976
    "Prescriptivism and Incompletness", in Mind, 1981
    "How Incomplete Is Prescriptivism?", in Mind 93, 1984
    Formal Ethics (London: Routledge, 1996)

  208. Joshua Gert

    "Practical Rationality, Morality and Purely Justificatory Reasons" in American Philosophical Quarterly 37, 2000
    "Skepticism about Practical Reasons Internalism" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 39, 2001
    "Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy" in Philosophical Quarterly 52, 2002
    "Expressivism and Language Learning" in Ethics 102, 2002

    Gert proposes a constraint that expressivist semantic theories must meet and urges that this may be difficult. Suppose an expressivist semantics is true of our language in generation N. Then it has to be supposed to remain true for generation N+1 given our best understanding of how children learn normative language. But it is hard to see how this should be. A child is liable to learn to associate terms like "morally wrong" with the extension determined by his parents' attitudes. He is liable to be corrected when using "morally wrong" to express his own attitudes except in cases whre his parents' attirudes concur. He is thus apt to grow up using "morally wrong" as a descriptive term picking out that extension (Some small variation between his parents will render his use of the term vague but not problematically so). Dreier-style speaker relativism, Gert also argues, faces much the same difficulty.

    "Cognitivism, Expressivism and Agreement in Response" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaetics,/I> 2, pp. 77-110.

  209. Alan Gewirth

    "Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics" in Mind 69, 1960.
    "Positive "Ethics" and Normative "Science" in Philosophical Review 69, 1960.
    "Meaning and Criteria in Ethics" in Philosophy 38, 1963.
    "The Generalization Principle" in Philosophical Review 73, 1964.
    "Categorial Consistency in Ethics" in Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1967.
    "Metaethics and Moral Neutrality" in Ethics 78, 1968.
    "The Non-Trivializability of Universalizability" in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47, 1969.
    "Must One Play the Moral Language Game? In Alerican Philosophical Quarterly 7, 1970.
    "Some Comments on Categorial Consistency" in Philosophical Quarterly 20, 1970.
    "The Normative Structure of Action" in Review of Metaphysics 25, 1971.
    "The 'Is'-'Ought'Problem Resolved" in Proceedings and Adddresses of the A. P. A. 47, 1974.
    Reason and Morality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978)
    "On Deriving a Morally Significant 'Ought' in Philosophy 54, 1979.
    "Limitations of the Moral Point of View" in The Monist 63, 1980.
    "The Future of Ethics: The Moral Powers of Reason" in Nous 15, 1981.
    Human Rights (Chicago: Chocago University Press, 1982)
    "The Rationality of Reasonableness" in Synthese 57, 1983
    "The Epistemology of Human Rights" in Social Philosophy and Policy 1, 1984.
    "Can Any Final Ends be Rational?" in Ethics 102, 1991.
    "The Constitutive Metaphysics of Ethics" in Revue de Metaphysique et Morale 98, 1993.
    "Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge" in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge
    "The Immoral Sense" in Criminal Justice Ethics 13, 1994.
    "'Ought' and Reason for Action" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 35, 1997.
    "The Agent Prescriber's 'Ought'" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 35, 1998.

  210. Allan Gibbard

    "Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice" in Midwest Studies VII, 1982
    "A Non-Cognitivist Analysis of Rationality in Action" in Social Theory and Practice 9, 1983, pp. 199 - 221
    "Moral Judgement and the Acceptance of Norms" in Ethics 96, 1985
    "Normative Objectivity" in Nous 19, 1985
    "Reply to Sturgeon" in Ethics 96, 1985
    "An Expressivistic Theory of Normative Discourse" in Ethics 6, 1986
    "Hare's Analysis of "Ought" and its Implications" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
    "Communities of Judgment" in Social Philosophy and Policy 7, 1989.
    "Norm, Discussion and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles" in Ethics 100, 1990.
    Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P., 1990)

    Normative governance is the process of influence on norms we accept by conversations . normative discussion . about absent circumstances. When such discussion promotes consensus, this impacts on our feelings and actions, it can help to coordinate our actions and feelings and this coordinating role casts light on the likely evolutionary rationale for normative thought and language. Such thought and language .is part of nature, but it does not describe nature.. Thus Gibbard rejects any purely descriptive analysis of .rational. as failing to do justice to the element of endorsement in normative language. We should prefer his .norm-expressivistic analysis. of normative language. On such an analysis we understand what it is to be rational only indirectly through an understanding of what it is to judge something rational. To judge something rational is to accept a system of norms that permit it (where accepting a norm is a state manifested in a complex pattern of avowing that norm and acting in accordance with it.) Calling something rational is just expressing such an acceptance. (Analogously, to call R a reason for doing X is to express acceptance of a system of norms that treat R as weighing in favour of X). The norms one accepts are seen as making a contribution to the content of what one says independent of that made by one.s beliefs. The content of a judgement can be understood in terms of the set of .factual-normative worlds. (ordered pairs <w, n> where w is a possible world and a comprehensive system of norms) where that judgement holds (or, as Gibbard ultimately prefers to say, the set of such worlds it rules out). A sentence S holds in world <w, n> if a sentence Sn is true in w that is got from S by replacing normative terms like .required., .permitted. etc with n-corresponding descriptive terms like .required by n., .permitted by n., etc. If S1 holds in a subset of factual-normative worlds where S2 holds (or if the worlds S2 rules out are a subset of those S1 rules out), we may say S1 entails S2. If S2 holds in none of the factual-normative worlds where S1 holds (or if, between them, they rule out everything) they are inconsistent. We can understand normative judgements without supposing there to be any normative states of affairs that they represent. Our ordinary beliefs about our immediate surroundings are cases of natural representation, cases where a part of the world, here our cognitive natures, has evolved to correspond in some way to another part of it. More scientific beliefs are cases of designed, artificial representation. But we can best explain how we came by our normative beliefs without supposing there to be any normative facts. The fact-norm distinction can be defended as a claim about the in principle adequacy for interpreting the judgements we need to make in both living and understanding human lives of a hypothetical normative-Galilean language, free of thick concepts. Specifically moral norms are best understood, Gibbard suggests, as norms governing guilt and anger.

    Some of the norms we accept are higher-order norms governing the acceptance of norms. If I accept a norm along with some higher order norm demanding its acceptance, that apply to all and leave no slack, I treat it as a requirement of rationality. Existential commitments are weaker than this but stronger than matters of mere taste: here the commitment is merely to one.s own continued acceptance of the norm. Indeed I might accept a norm along with higher order norms that, while requiring me to accept it, requires others to accept other incompatible norms, a case of standpoint-dependent validity. In telling you that something is rational, however, I make a conversational demand on you, that you accept what I say. This makes particular sense if my judgements enjoy contextual authority being based on norms we both share. Or I may earn myself Socratic authority by bringing you to work out for yourself that norms you accept will lead you to agreement. Gibbard also thinks some sense can be made of what he calls fundamental authority, involving a form of raw (necessarily mutual and limited) trust in the judgements others make. For he argues not to be willing to accord such fundamental authority would undermine one.s trust even in one.s own normative judgements in ways that would threaten one with a paralysing hyperscepticism. Higher order norms may determine both .standards of conversational legitimacy. and the shape taken by the justifications those standards demand that we offer each other for conversational demands. To treat demands as objective is to take them to apply universally and do so openly and sincerely. But we may well not do this. In some cases this would be mere browbeating relative to any standards of conversational legitimacy that serve the central consensus-promoting function of normative discussion. Faced with outsiders holding exotic views we have four options: (a) parochialism (Greeks deny that Scythians any normative competence but have no story to tell about why); (b) relativism (the Greeks have a principled (and ultimately non-relative story to tell about why Scythian norms are right for Scythians, Greek norms for Greeks); (c) tell some epistemic story about why the outsiders get it wrong; (d) work towards constituting a single inclusive community of judgement. Among higher-order norms we need to distinguish norms of rationale which give some deep rationale the norms we accept should share and epistemic norms of warrant. That these can come apart is a further dimension in which we can make sense of the idea of normative objectivity: we can make sense of the thought that a members of a community might apply correct norms of warrant and come up with mistaken results. A direct pragmatism which took normative judgements to be warranted with reference simply to the costs and benefits of holding them would likely be self-defeating but a limited role for pragmatic considerations is apt to lead to normative scepticism given the role of pragmatic factors in shaping our dispositions to accept and reject norms. To avoid this we should allow pragmatic considerations at least a limited and indirect authority, accepting a .pragmatism of legitimate influence. that seeks to arrive at an account of which kinds of pragmatic influence promote good judgement and then accords authority to those subject to such influences. When normative consensus breaks down repression (coercion deemed illegitimate by those coerced) is sometimes justified though its costs are high. To avoid these costs where we can we may seek to form limited communities of judgement based on norms of toleration or accommodation.

    Morality is concerned with norms for anger and guilt but a broader range of emotions, sentiments in particular of benevolence, fairness and respect inform reflection on what the content of such norms should be. Normative inquiry into what our feelings should be has tentative beginnings in views which are a mixture of substantive (it makes sense to be sad when someone dies); formal (if it makes sense for me to be sad at something, it makes sense for you to be sad at similar things) and epistemological (views of what makes sense that result from careful thought carry some authority). Adam Smith was right to appeal to the gains from coordination in our feelings though coordination is often best served when our feeling mesh rather than simply matching up. Such pragmatic considerations favour in particular that our norms for guilt and anger should mesh and that we should conform our actions to them. Consistency in normative thought is not demanded of us, as cognitivists would suppose, as a condition for truth; but normative thought and discussion would lose much of its point without a tendency on our part to be governed by the norms we avow and to be consistent in our normative avowals. Normative inquiry, directed at the real good of consistency and objectivity, is driven both by philosophical refinement of our norms and the search for some pragmatic rationale for them. We thus seek to arrive at moral understandings that secure both convinction and consensus.

    Highly demanding and hugely rewarding, this is surely the most important work on metaethics since at least The Language of Morals.

    "Constructing Justice" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1991.
    "Moral Concepts: Substance and Sentiment" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992, pp. 199-221.
    "Precis of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992
    "Reply to Blackburn, Carson, Hill, and Railton" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992
    "Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 66, 1992, pp. 267-283.
    "Reply to Sinnot-Armstrong" in Philosophical Studies 69, 1993.
    "Preference and Preferability" in Fehige and Wessels, Preferences
    "Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard's Kantian Lectures" in Ethics 110, 1999.
    "Normative and Recognitional Concepts" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, 2002, pp. 151-167.
    "REasons Thick and Thin" in Journal of Philosophy 100, 2003, pp. 288-304.
    Thinking how to Live (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2003).


    "Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 195-215.
    "Normative Properties" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 319-337.
  211. Roger F. Gibson

    "Flanagan on Quinean Ethics" in Ethics 98, 1988, pp. 534-540.

  212. Margaret Gilbert

    "Vices and Self-Knowledge" in Journal of Philosophy 68, 1971
    On Social Facts (London: Routledge, 1989).

  213. Michael B. Gill

    "Relativity and the Concept of Morality" in Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999.

  214. Norman Gillespie

    (ed.)Moral RealismSouthern Journal of Philosophy XXIV, Spindel Conference 1985 (1986)

  215. Lou Goble

    "The Logic of Obligation, 'Better' and 'Worse'" in Philosophical Studies 70, 1993, pp. 133-163

  216. Peter Goldie

    (ed.): Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002)

  217. Alan Goldman

    "Red and Right" in The Journal of Philosophy 84, 1987
    "Global Moral Commitment" in American Philosophical Quarterly 25 1988
    Moral Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988)
    "Legal Reasoning as a Model for Moral Reasoning" Law and Philosophy 8, 1989
    "Skepticism About Goodness and Rightness" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, Supplement, 1991.
    "The Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment" in Inquiry 34, 1992.

  218. A. I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim

    (ed.) Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidl, 1978)

  219. D. Goldstick

    "The Causal Argument Against Ethical Objectivity" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification

  220. Robert M. Gordon

    "Socratic Definitions and "Moral Neutrality" in Journal of Philosophy 61, 1964.
    "The Circle of Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire

  221. Luke Gormally

    (ed.) Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe (Four Courts Press, 1994)

  222. J. C. B. Gosling

    Pleasure and Desire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969)

  223. Jorge Gracia

    (ed.): Philosophical Analysis in Latin America (Boston: Reidel, 1984)

  224. Selwyn A. Grave

    "Are the Analyses of Moral Concepts Morally Neutral?" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55, 1958
    "Too Good a Reason to be a Reason" in Analysis 20, 1959
    "Moral Distinctions in a State of Nature" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38, 1960

  225. Patricia S. Greenspan

    "Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives" in Journal of Philosophy 72, 1975.
    "Guilt and Virtue" in Journal of Philosophy 91, 1994.
    Practical Guilt, Moral Dilemmas, Emotions and Social Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
    "Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially Based Externalist Ethics" in Journal of Ethics 2, 1998.

  226. G. R. Grice

    The Grounds of Moral Judgement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)

  227. James Griffin

    "Are There Incommensurable Values?" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, 1977
    "Well-Being and Interpersonal Comparability" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
    "Values: Reduction, Supervenience and Explanation by Ascent" in Charles and Lennon, Reduction, Explanation and Realism
    "How We Do Ethics Now" in Griffiths, Ethics
    Value Judgement: Improving our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)

  228. A. Phillips Griffiths

    (ed.) Ethics (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1993).

  229. Carlos Gutiérrez

    (d.)El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (Bogatá: Editorial ABC, 1995)

  230. W. Haas

    "Value Judgments" in Mind 62, 1953.

  231. Ian Hacking

    (ed.) Essays in Analysis (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1985)

  232. Mane Hajdin

    "External and Now-for-Then Preferences in Hare's Theory" in Dialogue 29, 1990.
    "External Reasons and the Foundations of Morality: Mother Theresa versus Thrasymachus" in Journal of Value Inquiry 26, 1992.
    "Sanctions and the Notion of Morality" in Dialogue 32, 1993.
    The Boundaries of Moral Discourse (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1994).

  233. Alan Hajek and Philip Pettit

    "Desire Beyond Belief" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 2004, pp. 77-92

  234. John Haldane and Crispin Wright

    (ed.) Reality, Representation and Projection (New York, O.U.P., 1993)

  235. Bob Hale

    "The Compleat Projectivist" in Philosophical Quarterly 36, 1986, pp. 65-84.
    "Can There be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Haldane and Wright, Reality, Representation and Projection pp. 337-363.

    Confronted with the Frege-Geach problem, quasi-realists face a dilemma. Either they read evaluative conditionals as involving a dominant conditional operator, in which case it is hard to susstain an expressive construal of their compenents. Or they view them as involving a dominant attitude operator, in which case it is hard to do justice to our intuitions about validity. Blackburn's STW account falls foul of horn 2 as it misdiagnoses a moral failing (holding a combination of attitudes of which I disapprove) as a logical one. His AC accound, on the other hand, falls foul of horn 2. Blackburn understands 'If p then H!q' in terms of the tableau rule for the conditional as committing us to either denying p or insisting on q. But he does not see the commitment as distributing across the disjuction. But something must so distribute if the tableau rule is to make sense. And what if not truth? If, on the other hand, we try to understand conditionals as expressing higher-order attitudes but stick with the AC logic, we are threatened by the unacceptable comsequence that cases of modus ponens involving mixed conditionals (If Fred stole the money he should be punished, and such like) come out invalid.

    "Postscript" in Haldane and Wright, ibid.
    "Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege's Abyss?" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, pp. 144-149.

  236. Everett Hall

    What is Value: An Essay in Philosophical Analysis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952)

  237. Richard J. Hall

    "Are Pains necessarily Unpleasant? in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49, 1989, pp. 643-659.

  238. Stuart Hampshire

    "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" in Mind 58, 1949.
    "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy: A Reply to Mr Baier" in Mind 59, 1950.
    Morality and Pessimism(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972)
    "Morality and Convention" in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond

    A fine paper on relativism. Do our moral responses spring from nature or convention - nomos or physis - like standards of dress or standards of health? Both, says Hampshire, and these two sources of moral norms are related in complex ways. It is natural to human beings to value love and friendship but the norms that sustain thee values may differ in different social contexts. There are some norms that we take seriously in ways that survive critical reflection. But these may be local norms and we need not insist on understanding them as universally binding. The latter insistence is most appropriate in the domain of justice where the need for convergence is most pressing. Here Rawls applies a form of "stripping down" argument, stripping away particular cultural factors to reveal a core of shared rationality. But it is inappropriate, Hampshire urges, to apply such procedures in ethical thinking across the board.

    Morality and Conflict (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1983)

  239. Jean Hampton

    "Can We Agree on Morals?"in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, 1988.
    "Should Political Philosophy be Done without Metaphysics?" in Ethics 99, 1989
    "Rethinking Reason" in American Philosophical Quarterly 29, 1992
    "The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason" in Economics and Philosophy 10, 1994
    "Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason? in Hume Studies 21, 1995
    The Authority of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

  240. Roger Hancock

    "The Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare" in Journal of Philosophy 57, 1960.

    Argues that Moore and Hare's arguments fail. Moore claims for any non-ethical F we can significantly ask "Are F's good?" But what does "significantly ask" mean here? If the point is that "F's are not good" is never self-contradictory the question again naturalism is begged. If it is that "F" and "good" designate two distinct properties, Moore must at least say more to defend what he claims. Hare's version assumes that all ethical sentences are used to guide choices in ways non-ethical sentences are not and that equivalent action-guiding significance is a necessary condition for synonymy and both assumptions are deniable by the naturalist.

    "A Note on Hare's "The Language of Morals" in Philosophical Quarterly. 13, 1963.
    " A Note on Naturalism" in Ethics 77, 1966.

  241. Rollo Handy

    "Naturalistic Definitions in Ethics and "Common Usage"" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16, 1956.
    "The Naturalistic "Reduction" of Ethics to Science" in Journal of Philosophy 53, 1956.
    "The Genetic Fallacy and Naturalistic Ethics" in Inquiry 2, 1959.
    "Doubts about Ordinary Language in Ethics" in Inquiry 3, 1960.
    "Ethics, Human Needs and Individual Responsibility" in Humanist 27, 1967
    Value Theory and the Behavioural Sciences (Springfield, 1969)
    The Measurement of Value: Behavioural Science and Philosophical Approaches (Louis-Green, 1970)

  242. Marsha Hanen

    "Justification, Coherence and Feminism" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification

  243. Edward Harcourt

    "Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances" in Mind 114, 2005, pp. 249-275.

  244. R. M. Hare

    The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952)

    Evaluative language, like imperative language, is primarily used not descriptively, to say what is the case but prescriptively, to guide action. Like imperatives, value judgements cannot be deduced from factual, descriptive premises alone (exceptions being hypothetical imperatives and certain very unassuming judgements in which function words like 'auger' feature). Nonetheless value judgements are responsive to the character of the things valued. A word such as 'good' or 'ought' is a supervenient epithet. If two things differ in goodness or rightness, they must differ also in some other respect. For in applying a value term to something a speaker expresses his acceptance of a certain standard for things of that kind and a failure of supervenience would signal that the standard was an inconsistent one. This standard will vary from one comparison class to another: it provides, in the context of any such class, the criteria of application of a value term but, being thus variable, does not constitute its meaning. At the heart of Hare's analysis is his claim that "Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of any other words which themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are deprived of a means of performing this function." (p. 91) Value words have a further element of descriptive meaning but, with the more general value words, their evaluative meaning is primary as it is constant across all comparison classes and because it may drive changes in descriptive meaning. Value judgements, insofar as they have such evaluative meaning, entail imperatives governing choice and action and applicable across all relevantly similar cases. This is not true of ordinary language imperatives, which are not properly universal. But if we live with a certain artificiality in the construction of imperatives such as:
    All P's being Q, please.
    we could treat the latter as equivalent to the evaluative element in the meaning of:
    All P's ought to be Q.
    And we could then reconstruct (near enough) ordinary evaluative language on that basis. Only by treating evaluative meaning as primary can we understand why different people (the missionary and the cannibals with their contrasting moral standards) can communicate about and disagree over evaluative matters. There is a way of using value words without commendatory force but only in an "inverted commas" sense where we make no value judgement but merely allude to the value judgements of others. This commendatory use of moral language must again be seen as primary given that the inverted commas use is parasitical on the genuinely evaluative use - we must appeal to the latter in order to explain the content of the former. Moral judgements implicate principles: they are to be justified by reference to the speaker's standards as they apply to the facts of the case. When justification is sought of a complete set of standards determining fully a way of living no further justification can be given and it is a matter simply of our willingness to live in such a way. But this ultimate unjustifiability does not make our judgements arbitrary. It is too easy to forget just how good this ground-breaking book is.


    "Broad's Approach to Moral Philosophy" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of C. D. Broad.
    Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963)

    Hare here develops further the universal prescriptivism argued for in The Language of Morals which the opening chapters briefly recapitulate. "Ought", he then argues, implies "can" albeit not strictly logical sense, but rather much as, on Strawson's account, "The king of France is bald" implies "There is a king of France" - a case of certain judgements presupposing that certain questions arise. Prescriptive questions, questions about what one ought to do only arise when the corresponding practical questions, questions about what to do, arise. And the latter only arise with respect to actions within our control. "Within our control" here can be understood in a compatibilistic manner for practical questions will arise whether or not determinism is true. Given his prescriptivism, Hare denies that we can sincerely accept a moral judgement that we are able to act in accordance with and yet act contrary to it, seeking to explain cases of weakness of will either in terms of psychological impossibility or of subtle failures to mean what we profess to in a fully prescriptive way. In the light of universal prescriptivism, ethical theorizing is to be understood as the search for principles that we are able to commit ourselves to where that commitment is a universal one. We need to be able to accept the consequences of our moral judgements and we need to be able to accept them whichever roles we occupy in the circumstances to which they apply. Our inclinations determine what moral judgements we can accept on these terms by constraining which universal prescriptions we can assent sincerely to. This role is not played by hypothetical inclinations but by our actual inclinations albeit to a large extent with reference to hypothetical cases. Thinking in this way often calls on us to balance the interests of many people and universalizability demands that the interests of all should receive equal consideration. For we can only give special treatment to certain people on the basis of some ground that we are willing to universalize. For most of us, Hare suggests, thinking in this way will issue in acceptance of a utilitarian ethic that seeks maximally to advance the satisfaction of desires. Nonmoral ideals -such as aesthetic ideals - may be pursued without this concern for balancing competing interests in cases where the interests of others are not at stake. But, where the interests of others are involved, moral consideratons override considerations of other kinds. This thought can be avoided. It is avoidable in particular by the fanatic, by someone who is willing to prescribe that some people's interests, including in certain hypothetical circumstances his own, be subordinated to some ideal or other. But people who are willing clear-headedly to do this are, Hare suggests, extremely rare. This possibility of clear-headed fanaticism means that Hare's route from universalizability to utilitarianism is not a logically compulsory route. But it is a route, he urges, almost all of us will in fact, if we think clearly and rationally, freely elect to follow.

    "Descriptivism" in Proc. Brit. Ac. 49, 1963.
    "The Promising Game" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1964
    "Geach, Good and Evil" in Analysis 17, 1967.

    Geach thinks 'good' can be given a common descriptive meaning such that the descriptive characteristics it specifies are determined in each case by the meaning of the word or phrase it qualifies. This has some truth but only when we restrict our consideration to functional words and 'good' is often, and especially in moral contexts, applied other than to functional words. In such cases the standard being applied cannot at all be read off from the meaning of the word or phrase qualified. Perhaps Geach could insist on a functional interpretation for expressions like 'man' and 'human action' but then he could not insist, as in effect he does, that 'human action' is a comparison class within which we have always no option but to choose. Understanding 'human action' functionally one might perfectly well have simply no interest in performing good human actions.

    "Meaning and Speech Acts" in Philosophical Review 79, 1970, pp. 3-24.
    "The Argument from Received Opinion" in Essays in Philosophical Method
    Essays on Philosophical Method (London: Macmillan, 1971
    Practical Inferences (London: MacMillan, 1971)
    "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" in H. D. Lewis, Contemporary British Philosophy
    "Some Confusions about Subjectivity" in J. Bricke, Freedom and Morality
    "Prediction and Moral Appraisal" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978.
    "Relevance" in Goldman and Kim, Values and Morals.
    Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

    Hare recommends that we distinguish two levels of moral thinking: the intuitive level where we follow a set of simple prima facie principles and the critical level that makes no appeal to intuition and which should guide us both in the selection of intuitive principles and in resolving conflicts between them. In elaborating an account of how critical thinking works, Hare again seeks to build a case for utilitarianism from the requirements of universalizability and prescriptivity. The version of utilitarianism that results is less accommodating to the possibility of fanaticism than that of Freedom and Reason. There Hare allowed that someone, the fanatic, might universally prescribe the subordination of all, even his own, interests, to some ideal. However universalizability is now understood to work in a way that rules this out. A crucial role is played by the following claim about preferences: for me to know that, were I in your shoes I would have preference set S - which is just a matter of knowing that you have preference set S - is necessarily myself actually to have preference set S with the respect to the eventuality that I am circumstanced as you are. Universalizability then demands that when I make a decision that bears on your preferences I give the latter equal weight, as I am required to prescribe whatever I prescribe no less for the circumstance where I am in my actual situation than for the circumstances where I am in yours. Therefore, in deciding what should be done when preferences conflict, I must represent fully to myself the preference sets of all the people concerned and thereby acquire motivations corresponding in strength to all these, relative to all the various hypothetical circumstances universalizability requires me to keep in view, i.e. to those circumstances where I occupy the positions of each one of those concerned. This disallows any privileging of my own preferences vis-à-vis my actual circumstances, including my own moral convictions. So the only kind of 'fanatic' now allowed as possible is the very unlikely one whose moral convictions are so extremely strong as to outweigh any preferences that oppose them. (This picture of how moral thinking works has the advantage of reducing problems over the interpersonal comparisons of utility to a problem merely about intrapersonal comparisons: for it renders moral thinking not a matter of comparing my preferences to yours but one of comparing my preferences relative to my circumstances with those I have for the hypothetical case where I am circumstanced just as you are.) The consistent amoralist who refuses to make any moral judgements at all remains conceivable and this, Hare urges, saves his view from collapsing into a form of naturalism. There are strong objections to a consistent amoralism: for, taking the world as it is, an informed concern for the welfare of one's children would speak strongly against inculcating it. But these objections are prudential, not logical.
    "Supervenience" in P.A.S.S., 58, 1984.
    "Ontology in Ethics" in Honderich, Morality and Objectivity
    "Comments" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
    "Universal Prescriptivism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics
    "Objective Prescriptions" in Griffiths, Ethics.
    Replies (in German) to Birnbacher, Corradini, Fehige, Hinsch, Hoche, Kusser, Kutschera, Leist, Lampe, Lenzen, Lumer, Millgram, Moscher, Nida-Rumelin, Roh, Schaber, Schöne, Siefert, Stranzinger, Trapp, Vogler and Wolf in Fehige, Zum moralischer Denken.
    "Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge.
    "Off on the Wrong Foot" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics.

  245. Gilbert Harman

    "Moral Relativism Defended" in Philosophical Review 84, 1975, pp. 3-22.
    The Nature of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977)

    This book is rather like Mackie's Ethics: everybody has read the massively influential first chapter but the rest is a bit neglected. Harman's title hints at the naturalism that sets his agenda: Either moral facts are a part of nature ("naturalism") or there are no such facts ("nihilism"). Moore's open question argument, though often thought to refute naturalism fails, Harman urges, to do so - parallel reasoning would show that water was not H2O. Emotivism is characterized as a form of "moderate nihilism" that seeks to understand moral language as serving some non-fact-stating role (while "extreme nihilism" simply rejects morality.) But Harman is dissatisfied with emotivism, reading it as a view that identifies moral judgements with attitudes of some special kind but fails to specify what kind that is in any adequate and nontrivial way. A similar problem bedevils the ideal observer theory, a theory some form of which emotivists are under some pressure to adopt in order to make sense of the possibility of moral error. Moral facts, Harman famously argues in chapter 1, play no role in explaining our observations. A scientist's observations are explained (on a good day) by the facts of scientific theory; but moral facts are irrelevant to explaining our moral "observations" and moral judgements. Harman's metaethics is not however anti-realist so much as reductionist: the central kind of moral facts expressed by moral "ought" statements can be analysed as relational facts about reasons. To say P ought to do D is to say that P has good reasons, relative to certain conventional principles P and myself both endorse, to do D. Unlike moral facts, facts about reasons do play a role in explaining observations, in particular psychological observations. Accordingly their status is not problematic (Harman sketches an account of reasons in terms of good reasoning and of good reasoning in terms of how an ideally functioning reasoner would reason.). So while there are no absolute facts about right and wrong, there are relative facts about right and wrong, the relativity kicking in with respect to particular conventions. So a form of relativism is true: moral principles apply to us in virtue of conventions in force in our society. This does not make moral criticism of our conventional morality impossible as certain of our principles may be open to objection in the light of certain others. The conventionism is given a psychoanalytic twist in Harman's suggestion that members of each generation internalises the moral standards of their parents in the form of the superego which operates as a key source of moral motivation. Harman also anticipates Williams in his defence of a strong form of internalism about moral reasons: our conventions simply do not apply to outsiders who fail to satisfy them.


    "Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 3, 1978
    "What Is Moral Relativism?" in Goldman and Kim, Values and Morals
    "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam's Reason, Truth and History" in Journal of Philosophy 79, 1982.
    "Justice and Moral Bargaining" in Soc. Phil. and Pol. 1, 1983.
    "Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty" in PPA 12, 1983.
    "Is There A Single True Morality?" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth, pp. 27-48.
    Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator (Kansas: The Lindley Lecture, 1986).
    "Moral Explanations of Natural Facts: Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality?" in Gillespie, Moral Realism, pp. 57-68.
    Rationality in Agreement: A Commentary on Gauthier's Morals by Agreement" in Social Philosophy and Policy, 5, 1988.
    "Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism" in Odegard and Stewart, Perspectives on Moral Relativism.
    "Desired Desires" in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality.
    "Explaining Value" in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Soc. Phil. Pol. 11 1994.
    "Responses to Critics" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 58, 1998, pp. 207-213.

  246. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson

    Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)

  247. J. Harrison

    "The Importance of Being Important" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978
    "Deontic Logic and Imperative Logic", in Geach, Logic and Ethics

  248. John C. Harsanyi

    "Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code To Follow And, Indeed, To Follow Any Moral Code At All?" in Ethics 96, 1985.

  249. Begum Hasna

    "Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, 1979.

  250. Helen Haste

    "Moral Responsibility and Moral Commitment: The Integration of Affect and Cognition" in Wren, The Moral Domain
    "Communitarianism and the Social Construction of Morality" in Journal of Moral Education 25, 1996.

  251. Anthony Hatzimoysis

    "Analytical Descriptivism Revisited" in Ratio 15, 2002
    (Ed.) Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

  252. S. Hauerwas and A. MacIntyre

    (eds.) Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983).

  253. William H. Hay

    "C. L. Stevenson and Ethical Analysis" in Philosophical Review 56, 1947.
    "Frederick L. Will on Morality" in Westphal, Pragmatism, Reason and Norms

  254. Joseph Heath

    "Foundationalism and Practical Reason" in Mind 106, 1997

  255. John Heil

    (ed.): Rationality, Morality and Self Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).

  256. Bennett Helm

    "Freedom of the Heart" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, 1996.
    "Emotional Reason: How to Deliberate about Value" in American Philosophical Quarterly 37, 2000.
    Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
    "Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation" in Nous 35, 2001

  257. Ulrike Heuer

    "Reasons for Actions and Desires” in Philosophical Studies 121, 2004, pp. 43-63.
    "Raz on Values and Reasons” in Pettit, Scheffler, Smith and Wallace, Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, pp. 129-152.
    "Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?" in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, 2006.

  258. John Hill

    The Ethics of G. E. Moore: A New Interpretation (Assen: van Gorcum, 1976)
    "Moral Cognitivism: More Unlikely Analogues" in Ethics 86, 1976.
    "Can We Talk About Ethics Anymore?" in Journal of Business Ethics 14, 1995.

  259. Thomas E. Hill Jr.

    "Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985, pp. 3-23.
    "Kantian Constructivism in Ethics" in Ethics 99, 1989
    "Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992
    "REasonable Self-Interest" in Philosophy and Social Policy 14, 1997, pp. 52-85.
    "Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001

  260. Risto Hilpinen

    (ed.) New Studies in Deontic Logic (Dordrecht: Reidl, 1981)

  261. Wilfred Hodges

    "Logic, Truth and Moral Judgements" in Lovibond and Williams, Identity, Truth and Value

  262. Richard Holton

    "Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps" in Philosophical Studies 97, 2000

  263. S. Holzman and C. Leich

    (ed.) Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule (London Routledge: 1981)

  264. Ted Honderich

    (ed.) Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge, 1985)

  265. Brad Hooker

    "Williams' Argument Against External Reasons" in Analysis 44, 1987
    "Theories of Welfare, Theories of Good Reasons for Action, and Ontological Naturalism" in Philosophical Papers 20, 1991
    (ed.)Truth in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell 1996)
    'Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism?' in Hooker, Mason and Miller, Morality, Rules and Consequences, pp. 222-238.
    "Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad" in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, pp. 1-22.

  266. Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little

    (Eds.)Moral Particularism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)

  267. Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason and Dale E. Miller

    (eds.)Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.)

  268. Christopher Hookway

    "Two Conceptions of Moral Realism in P. A. S. S. 60, 1986, pp. 189-206.
    "Fallibilism and Objectivity: Science and Ethics" in Altham and Harrison, World, Mind and Ethics, pp. 46-67

  269. Terence Horgan

    From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World" in Mind 92, 1993.

  270. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons

    "New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth" in Journal of Philosophical Research 16, 1991, pp. 447-465 and in Heil, Rationality, Morality and Self-Interest.
    "Troubles on Moral Twin-Earth: Moral Queerness Revived" in Synthese 92, 1992, pp. 224-260.
    "Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The Open Quesion Argument Revived" in Philosophical Papers 21, 1992, pp. 153-176.
    "From Moral Realism to Moral reletivism in One Easy Step" in Critica 28, 1996, pp. 3-39.
    "Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism" in Philosophical Papers 25, 1996, pp. 203-231.
    "Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth" in Synthese 124, 2000, pp. 139-152.
    "Non-Descriptivist Cognitivism: Outline of a New Metaethic" in Philosophical Papers 29, 2000, pp. 121-153.
    "Cognitivist Expressivism" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 255-298.
    "Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 73-98.
    (Eds.): Metaethics After Moore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)
    "Morality Without Moral Facts" in Dreier, COntemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 220-238.

  271. Christoph Horn and Dieter Schönecker

    (eds.): Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005)

  272. Paul Horwich

    Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)
    "Gibbard's Theory of Norms" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, 1993.

    Gibbard, in denying there are normative facts, is really just denying there are naturalistic normative facts. In a weaker sense of facts where It is a fact that p is equivalent to p, it is just harmless to say there are normative facts. A better understanding of expressivism is as combining an implicit definition of rational in terms of believes that x is rational and a denial that normative facts explain anything. The word rational gets to express a property and to help formulate truths because it shares an inferential role with other predicates. The expressivist does not have to explain why the term has this role but just to defend the assumption that this supposition is consistent with expressivism. For this, it's enough that the word's application is constrained by the speaker's state of mind and a fair degree of intersubjective agreement may be expected. Given this predicative inferential role, the Frege-Geach problem is no problem.

    "The Essence of Expressivism" in Analysis 54, 1994, pp. 19-20.

    Evaluative utterances, according to Michael Smith's understanding of expressivism, are expressions of desires and cannot be true. Horwich is prepared to accept the first conjunct but denies the second. He accepts there is a connection between belief and truth but denies that beliefs should be identified by a causal role distinct from that of desire. The essence of expressivism is just the claim that X is right (a) expresses a desire and (b) functions logically as a predicate. A question remains whether (a) and (b) account for our practice but we need not explain (b) on the basis of (a) and their mutual consistency is unproblematic.
  273. Donald C. Hubin

    "Prudential Reasons" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, 1980
    "Irrational Desires" in Philosohical Studies 62, 1991, pp. 23-44.
    "Hypothetical Motivation" in Nous 30, 1996, pp. 31-54.
    "What's Special About Humeanism?" in Nous 33, 1999, pp. 30-45.
    "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality" in journal of Philosophy 98, 2001, pp. 445-468.
    "Desires, Whims and Values" in Journal of Ethics 7, 2003, pp. 315-335.

  274. Donald C. Hubin and David Drebushenko

    "Quicksand in the Contract Ground" in Philosophical Studies 44, 1983, pp. 115-120.

  275. Donald C. Hubin and Michael Perkins

    "Self-Subverting Principles of Choice" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, 1986, pp. 1-10.

  276. W. D. Hudson

    "Moral Arguments" in Mind 68, 1959.
    "On the Alleged Objectivity of Moral Judgments" in Mind 71, 1962.
    "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'" in Philosophical Quarterly 14, 1964.
    "The 'Is'-'Ought' Controversy" in Analysis 25, 1965.
    Ethical Intuitionism (London: MacMillan, 1967)
    "Fact and Moral Value" in Religious Studies 5, 1969.
    Modern Moral Philosophy (London MacMillian, 1970) (second Edition, 1983).
    "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved" in Regis, Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism
    "The Development of Hare's Moral Philosophy" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics.

  277. Michael Huemer

    "Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, 2000
    Ethical Intuitionism (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005)

  278. Douglas Huff and Omar Prewett

    (eds.) The Nature of the Physical Universe (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979)

  279. I. L. Humberstone

    "First Steps in Philosophical Taxonomy" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, 1982
    "Direction of Fit" in Mind, 101, 199, pp. 59-83.
    "A Study in Philosophical Taxonomy" in Philosophical Studies 83, 1996
    "Two Types of Circularity" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 1997, pp. 249-280.

  280. Ivor Hunt

    "Value Concepts and Conceptual Truth" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63, 1963.

  281. Thomas Hurka

    "The Speech Act Fallacy Fallacy" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, 1982
    "Two Kinds of Organic Unity" in The Journal of Ethics 2, 1998.

  282. Paul Hurley

    "Where Traditional Accounts of Practical Reason Go Wrong" in Logos 10, 1989
    A Kantian Rationale for Desire-Based Justification" in Philosophers' Imprint 1, 2001

  283. Susan Hurley

    Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989
    "Reason and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction?" in Analysis 61, 2001

  284. Rosalind Hursthouse

    "Arational Actions" in Journal of Philosophy 1991
    On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) (especially chapters 9-11)

  285. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn

    (ed.)Virtues and Reasons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)

  286. Nadeem Hussain

    "The Return of Moral Fictionalism" in Philosophical Perspectives18, 2004, pp. 149-187.

  287. Nadeem Hussein and Nishi Shah

    "Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 265-294.


Return to Top

Return to Index

I-P

Q-Z