Jimmy Lenman HomePage / Metaethics Bibliography Q-Z
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"On the Nature of Moral Values" in Goldman and Kim, Values and Morals,
pp. 37-45 and in Quine, Theories and Things, pp. 55-66.
Theories and Things (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
"Reply to Morton White" in Schlipp and Hahn, The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, pp. 663-665.
"Divine Command Theory" in LaFollette, The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory
"Moral and Other Realisms: Some Initial Difficulties" in Goldman and Kim,
Values and Morals
"Truth and Explanation in Ethics" in Ethics 96, 1986, pp. 524-544.
"Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity" in PPA 16, 1987.
Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
"Putting Rationality in Its Place" in Frey and Morris, Value, welfare and Morality and Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Virtues and Reasons
Quinn argues that if we understand desires simply as states of being disposed to act in certain ways, they can carry no normative significance and so the instrumentalist conception of practical reason to which he sees subjectivist (by which he means noncognitivist) views as committed can make no sense. To desire a thing, in this sense, gives us no reason either to pursue it or to pursue the means to it. Desire, however, can rationalize choice but only in virtue of the fact that, when it is conceived in a more adequate way inconsistent with subjectivism, as typically involving an evaluation of the desired object as good. Practical rationality is thinking effectively about how we should obtain what is good. But it is not ethically fundamental in the way the human good is ethically fundamental.
"The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Values in Ethics 114, 2004, pp. 391-423.
"Wants, Reasons and Justifications" in Philosophical Quarterly 18,
"Reasons for Action" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1, 1971.
"Evaluating from a Point of View" in Journal of Value Inquiry 6, 1972.
Can Ethics Provide Answers?" Hastings Centre Report 10, 1980
"The Elements of Moral Philosophy" (New York: Random House, 1986)
"Subjectivism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics
"Naturalism" in LaFollette, The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory
"Hume on Motivating Sentiments: The general Point of View and the Inculcation
of Morality" in HUme Sudies 20, 1994, pp. 37-58.
"Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate" in Hume Studies 25, 1999, pp. 101-122.
"A Normative Regress Problem" in American Philosophical Quarterly
"Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, 2000
"Facts and Values" in Philosophical Topics 14, 1986.
"Moral Realism" in Philosophical Review 95, 1986, pp. 163-207.
An extremely influential defence thereof. The fact/value distinction is not well motivated by appeal to an instrumental understanding of reason once it is granted, as PR does, that moral facts are not necessarily reason-providing. I do not always have instrumental reason to be moral but that no more makes morality arbitrary and subjective than analogous considerations make logic arbitrary and subjective. The strategy is to employ the sort of argument to best explanation that appeals to realists vis à vis the external world. For such an argument to be effective, we need reason to suppose the domain of moral facts is independent of what we think about it and yet able to interact causally with us in ways that shape our thought. To this end, PR first characterizes a notion non-moral goodness in terms of a person's objective interests, the things that, in ideal epistemic circumstances, he would want for his (actual) self. Objective interests may play an explanatory role, in particular in the evolution of desires via the wants/interests mechanism whereby we learn about our interests through experience and in other ways, not necessarily conscious or rational. It could be argued that the explanatory work such value does is fundamentally being done just by its supervenience base, but if this consideration undermined realism about goodness it would do the same for, say biology. In the case of moral right and wrong we might be sceptics about whether "ought"s can feature in explanation. They can, argues PR, when we are concerned with criterial, explanations - explanations that make implicit reference to some contextually fixed goal. Moral norms may be supposed to reflect what is rational from the social point of view, what would be rationally approved were everyone's interests counted equally given full information. Such social rationality may play a role in criterial explanations: arguably, e.g., departures from it may generate pressures that may serve to lessen the extent of departure. Moral rightness, thus naturalistically understood, does not give categorical reasons and need not always motivate but connects clearly with "what characteristically would motivate individuals who are prepared to submit themselves to relevant sorts of scrutiny."
"Naturalism and Prescriptivity" in Social Philosophy and Policy
7, 1989, pp. 151-174.
"Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse" in PPR 53, 1992.
"Some Questions About the Justification of Morality" in Philosophical Perspectives 6 1992.
"Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative" in Villanueva, Naturalism and Normativity, pp. 36-52.
"What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us To See The Naturalist Must Help Us To Explain" in Haldane and Wright, Reality, Representation and Projection
Of the three features of moral discourse that seem to favour noncognitivism, the supposed oddness of moral facts, the persistence of moral disagreement and the normativity of moral judgement, the trickiest for the naturalist is normativity. The noncognitivist's problem here is capturing what makes some but not all non-hypothetical evaluative attitudes moral. If he appeals to their descriptive content, his position loses its distinctness as a wise cognitivist will allow moral language some noncognitive functions. And appeal to a distinction between the meaning and grounds of judgements of goodness works the analytic-synthetic distinction very hard. We often want to say not only the wrongness of an action but the independence of this from my attitudes have their basis in the character of the action itself. Here too a distinction between the content and the characteristic grounds of moral judgement is possible but problematic. The naturalist, by characterizing moral goodness as that which contributes to wellbeing, impartially considered, can explain both the distinctive importance we accord morality and its independence from my attitudes. Morality standards are neither hypothetical nor based on prudence but epistemic standards can be like this too and it doesn't worry us much. The naturalist can characterize and explain a strong tie between moral judgement and motivation but this will be a contingent, empirical matter, not one of conceptual necessity.
"Reply to David Wiggins" in ibid.
Substantive naturalismis a view which proposes a semantic interpretation of concepts in some area in terms of properties that pull their weight in science. Analytic naturalism that did this on a priori grounds would be vulnerable to Moore-type Open Question Argument objections. But a substantive naturalist might alternatively claim a synthetic identity on a posteriori grounds. If continuity with linghuistic usage were claimed the OQA might be evidence against such a view but could not refute it. Such an account need not be reductionist though PR's sympathies lie with versions that are - these need not be eliminativist. A naturalistic account is sketched on which moral norms develop in response to real, empirically accessible properties. This goes some way to capturing the normativity of ethics. Discussing Wittgenstein's famous example, PR notes that lying, unlike bad tennis-playing, can impact significantly on human wellbeing. This explains why, for most people, it is motivationally significant. Though not necessarily for all people - moral reasons are not categorical. If, like Wiggins, we tie our understanding of morality to the sentiments of a socially situated agent we risk an unwelcome relativism. "Objective vindication" is possible if we can show our moral judgements to track features of the world that contribute to human wellbeing, impartially considered. PR finds it obscure how treating moral concepts as sui generis would be helpful in this context.
"Subject-ive and Objective" in Ratio 1995, pp. 259-276.
"In Search of Nonsubjective Reasons" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society
"Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics
"The Diversity of Moral Dilemmas" in Mason, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory
"Moral Realism: Prospects and Problems" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge?
"On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Action" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason, pp. 53-79.
"Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism" in Levinson, Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection
Railton in this interesting and suggestive paper develops an account of aesthetic objectivity via a reconstruction of the argument of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste". On this Humean picture certain widespread commonalities among humans make possible what Railton calls the infrastructure of a suitable field of value in virtue of a pervasive conformity relation or match between things in the world and our sensibilities. Beauty is constituted by (though not to be analysed or defined in terms of) the properties of things that make for such a match and these beauty-constituting properties are explanatory of our favourable responses. This infrastructure is the basis for a standard of taste as particular sensitivity to such generally appreciated properties is the hallmark of aesthetic expertise and explains why we should and do defer to it. These reflections on aesthetics are then extended into moral value where, Railton suggests, we can view Mill's account of the settled preferences of experienced judges as articulating a standard of desirability analogous to Hume's standard of taste."Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, 1998, pp. 175-182.
Plausibly the extension of colour terms is fixed rigidly by actual perceptual experience but, Railton argues, the same is plausibly not true of values. Consideration of an imaginary variant form of humanity for whom biological kinship relations had no special normative significance does not encourage the thought that such hypothetical humans would be acting and judging inappropriately given the kind of creatures they are. Intrinsic good should be thought of, not as relative but as relational. In this and in the way our classifications by value are plausibly driven by our practical concerns, values do indeed plausibly resemble certain secondary qualities: not those of colour but qualities of taste such as bitter or sweet."Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But not Hume versus Kant" in Ratio 12, 1999.
(ed.)Prospect for Metaphsyics: Essays of Metaphysical Exploration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961).
The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press, 1947)
Moral Judgement (New York: MacMillan, 1995)
"Sidgwick on Intuitionism" in The Monist 58. 1974
Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)
"Quasi-Realism and Mind-Independence" in Philosophical Quarterly 35, 1985.
"Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" in Philosophical Review
A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)
"The Independence of Moral Theory" in Proc. A.P.A., 1975
"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980" in Journal of Philosophy 77, 1980.
These are Rawls' rich and very demanding Dewey Lectures. According to KC we view principles of justice (to which Rawls' account is limited) as the outcome of a constructive procedure, in the "orginal position", whereby agreement on such principles is arrived at by a body of notional persons characterized in terms of a conception of "rational autonomy". That is, they act, in the light of sound principles of rational choice with a view to securing their highest-order interests in being able to advance their moral powers (the capacity for a sense of justice and for some conception of the good) but unconstrained by an prior conception of justice. The constructive procedure represents an ideal of free persons conceived as "self-originating sources of claims" by not requiring the parties to justify the claims they advance. It represents an ideal of equality by situating the parties symmetrically and it represents the central ideal of fairness by imposing a veil of ignorance on their deliberations that deprives them of knowledge of their position in society and their particular conceptions of the good. In these and other ways the characterization of the original position and the parties to it is intended to model a certain moral ideal, a conception of moral persons as free and equal, that Rawls takes to be implictly affirmed within democratic societies. Procedures by which principles are selected must thus "be suitably founded on practical reason, or, more exactly, on notions which characterize persons as reasonable and rational and which are incorporated into the way in which, as such persons, they represent to themselves their free and equal moral personality." The aim is that we can so adequately represent this ideal within the original position that we may take the procedure carried out within it as definitive of that conception of justice that best organizes our considered convictions. If this is so, a conception of justice so defined is authoritative for us as being the best workable basis available to us for public justification. An ideal of how moral persons conceived as free and equal should relate to one another as citizens is modelled by the notion of a "well-ordered society", a society effectively regulated by the principles of justice that the parties to an original position, the characterization of which is motivated by a desire adequately to represent such a conception of the person, would choose. Because the citizens of a well-ordered society all effectively affirm a shared conception of justice, their autonomy is "full autonomy". They thus recognize the overriding force of reasons determined by a public conception of justice, reasons whose status as such is determined by the choice of principles by the parties to the original position. Ethical inquiry is not, as rational intuitionists would have it, a matter of our finding out a body of moral facts prior to and independent of that inquiry: on such a view there is no role for any conception of the person richer than a very bare conception of the person as knowing subject. Rather, according to KC, the pursuit of moral justification is a practical and political rather than epistemological or metaphysical problem. We thus need to arrive at a conception precise enough to serve its practical purposes and not so complex as to defeat them. So not all moral questions need be supposed to have answers. We aim to settle the most fundamental issues of justice and other moral conflicts may be simply left as arenas for compromise. The principles of justice recommended by "justice as fairness" are subject to a certain contingency insofar as the constructive procedure is informed by various general facts about people and society, most notably the fact that the circumstances of justice (moderate scarcity and a divergence in conceptions of the good), whose contingency they inherit.
"Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy" in Forster, Kant's Transcendental Deductions and in Collected Papers
On Rawls' reading as articulated here, "an essential feature of Kant's constructivism is that first principles of right and justice are seen as specified by a procedure of construction" (the Categorical Imperative Procedure). The procedure is to express the requirements of practical reason as embedded in our conception of ourselves as reasonable, rational responsible moral agents. The CI procedure itself is not constructed but "simply laid out": for Kant in the 2nd Critique, the moral law can have no deduction but rests on the Fact of Reason. This "is the fact that in our common moral consciousness we recognize and acknowledge the moral law as supremely authoritative and immediately directive for us." By giving practical reality to the idea of freedom the moral law obtains all the authentication possible and necessary. Kantian constructivism conceives of objectivity differently from rational intuitionism. For Kant a correct moral judgement is one conforming to the relevant criteria of reasonableness and rationality. Our common practical reason is the source of our agreement in judgements. And because of this commonality the CI procedure will yield the same results whoever applies it. The upshot, according to Rawls, is at once a constructivist conception of practical reason and a coherentist account of its authentication.Political Liberalism(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.)
"Reasons for Action, Decision and Norms" in Mind 84, 1975
The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
"Value Incommensurability" in P. A. S. 86, 1986
Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)
"Mixing Values" in P. A. S. S. 65, 1991
"Moral Change and Social Relativism" in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, also in Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994)
"The Moral Point of View" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society,
"The Amoralist" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Incommensurability and Agency" in Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason
Raz claims that incommensurability is widespread by opposing the "rationalist" conception of human agency which counts an agent.s own desires as reasons for action. Desires, he argues, are responsible to but do not themselves constitute reasons. Given that desires do not provide a source of commensurating values and given the lack of other credible candidates for this role, widespread incommensurability is inevitable."When We are Ourselves: The Active and The Passive" in P. A. S. S. 91, 1997 and in Engaging Reason, pp. 5-21.
(ed.): Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)
Against Evaluator Relativity: A Response to Sen" in Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12, 1983
"The Value of Rational Nature" in Ethics 112, 2002, pp. 267-291.
"Reasonableness in Ethics" in Philosophical Studies 5, 1954
A Theory of Reaons for Actions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)
Principles of Literary Criticism (New York: Harcourt Brace: 1924),
esp chapter 7.
"Emotive Meaning Again" in Philosophical Review 57, 1948.
"A Defence of Evolutionary Ethics" in Biology and Philosophy 1,
"Dutch Objections to Evolutionary Ethics" in Biology and Philosophy 4, 1989
"Humean Intentions" in American Philosophical Quarterly 35, 1998
.Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity. in Journal of Political Philosophy 9, 2001.
For Scanlon an act is wrong if (roughly) it would be unreasonable for anyone to reject it. Scanlon.s critics construct a dilemma. If the reasons for which a principle is rejectable are moral reasons then the appeal to reasonable rejection is otiose, a pointless epicycle. A more economical theory would simply ground the ineligibility of the principles in question on these very moral reasons. But if they are non-moral reasons, the theory cannot succeed as an account of moral reasons. In fact it is Scanlon.s view that the reasonable rejection he has in mind is based on agent-relative reasons. Such rejection can still ground moral reasons given the constraint that rejection must be (morally) reasonable. This does not make the theory circular, but merely embodies a holism about moral justification. So the pointless epicycle. objection to contractualism fails."Moral Non-Naturalism" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003.
"Explanation and Empathy" in Review of Metaphysics 40, 1987
"Foundationalism in Political Theory" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, 1987
"Questionable Objectivity" in Nous 27, 1993.
"Imagination, Desire and Prescription" in Analysis 41, 1981.
"Is Hare a Naturalist?" in Philosopical Review 91, 1982
"Internalism about Moral Reasons" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
"Hume on Practical Reason" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1990.
"Practical Reasons, Authority and Education" in Philosophy of Education
"Moral Education, Subjectively Speaking" in Philosophy of Education 44, 1988.
"Moral Judgmement" in Philosophy of Education 46, 1990.
"The Emotive Theory of Ethics" in P.A.S.S. 22, 1948.
"Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality," Philosophical Studies
"Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism," Philosophical Quarterly 46, 1996
"Expressivism and Irrationality," Philosophical Review 105, 1996, pp. 311-335.
Focusing on Blackburn and Gibbard, van Roojen argues that the main attempts at solving the Frege-Geach Problem by expressivists fail to distinguish as they must between strict logical inconsistency and the sort of pragmatic incoherence involved in e.g. accepting both
It is wrong for me to believe that my father is unfaithful to my mother.
My father is unfaithful to my mother.
Such accounts thus seem committed to finding inconsistency where there is none. He also worries that Blackburn's and Gibbard's accounts beg certain question about moral dilemmas in making it a truth of logic that what is forbidden can never be required.
"Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory" in Ethics
"Motivational Internalism: A Somehwat Less Idealized Account" in Philosophical Quarterly 50, 1999
"Should Motivational Humeans be Humeans about Rationality?" in Topoi 21, 2002
"Moral Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2004.
"Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic" in Ratio 18, 2005, pp. 190-205.
"Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality" in Philosophical Studies126, 2005, pp. 285-295.
"Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, I, pp. 161-193.
"Naturalism, Normativity and the Open Question Argument" in Nous
"Persons, Perspectives and Full Information Accounts of the Good" in Ethics 105, 1995.
"Internalism and the Good for a Person" in Ethics 106, 1996.
"Brandt's Notion Of Therapeutic Agency" in Ethics 110, 2000
"Agency and the Open Question Argument" in Ethics 113, 2003, pp. 490-527.
"Personal Good" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics after Moore, pp. 107-131.
"Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism" in Nous 32, pp. 386-405.
"Must We Return to Moral Realism?" in Inquiry 34, 1991.
"Are Ethical Judgements Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from Acquired Sociopathy" in Philosophical Psychology 16, 2003, pp. 51-66.
"On the Method of Ethics" in Journal of Philosophy, 1948
"The Nature of Morally Good Action" in P.A.S. 29, 1928-9
The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938)
"Rejecting Ethical Deflationism" in Ethics116, 2006, pp. 742-768
"Explaining Motivated Desires" in Topoi 21, 2002
"The Nature and Limits of Moral Objectivism" in Philosophical Forum 29, 1998
"The Limitations of Ethical Theory" in Zygon 18, 1983.
"Roger Sperry's Science of Values" in Journal of Mind and Behaviour 8, 1987.
"Evolutionary Naturalistic Justifications of Morality: A Matter of Faith and Works" in Biology and Philosophy 6, 1991.
"The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions" in Biology and Philosophy 6, 1991.
The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
"Really taking Darwin Seriously: An Alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian Metaethics" in Biology and Philosophy 5, 1990
"Commending and Describing" in Philosophical Quarterly 11, 1961.
"From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism" in Philosophical Quarterly 36, 1986.
"The Morality of the Gene" in the Monist 67, 1984.
"Moral Relativism and Moral Realism" in The Monist 67, 1984.
"Two Forms of Ethical Scepticism" in Pojman, Ethical Theory
"Ideals and Practice" in Philosophy 17, 1942
"Is Anthropology Relevant to Ethics?" in P.A.S.S. 20, 1946.
"Aristotle and a Refutation of Naturalism" in Journal of Value Inquiry 6, 1972.
"The Autonomy of Morals" in Mind 1957
Individual Conduct and Social Norms (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975)
Ethical Emotivism (Dordrecht: Matinus Nijhoff, 1987)
"A Modest Conception of Moral Sense Perception" in Erkenntnis 19, 1983
"Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
"Deontic Logic and the Priority of Moral Theory," Noûs 1986.
"The Many Moral Realisms," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spindel Conference Supplement, 1986
(ed.)Essays on Moral Realism(Ithaca: Cornell U. P., 1988
"Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence," Midwest Studies 12, 1988 pp. 433-57.
Moral hypotheses and properties plausibly require validation by figuring in the best explanations of our observations. It does not suffice, as Sturgeon claims, that they be relevant to explaining our observations. For hypotheses about witches might pass this test if witch-invoking explanations were widespread in our practice and if we accepted a supervenience account of witchhood. The worry is not irrelevance but impotence . what moral hypotheses and properties would lack if the observations we can explain by invoking them could be explained every bit as well without invoking them. But GSM thinks certain moral properties, notably virtue properties, will plausibly pass this test on any plausible interpretation of it as they will feature in certain genuine and general regularities that we cannot identify and explain with invoking them. But that would not close off the possibility that such properties lacked any normative significance. We need to show not only that moral properties have explanatory force but also that they have justificatory force. Reflection on parallels with the normative significance of epistemological hypotheses might, GSM suggests, be a fruitful avenue to explore here."Deception and Reasons to be Moral," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1989
Sayre McCord distinguishes between conventional rules - laws etc. - and trans-conventional rules of morality and morality which at least seem less dependent on social contingencies. The former, he argues, can sometimes play an explanatory role, even one unmediated by beliefs about them (notably sometimes in explaining these beliefs themselves). The latter may also plausibly be thought to do explanatory work. To make this thought good, given some normative theory (of rationality or morality) we need to identify and describe some feedback mechanism whereby actions that violate the rules may carrry individual or social costs, those that comply with them benefits, and these costs and benefits have causal impacts. Plausibly, he suggests, just this can be made good in the cases of utilitarian and contractarian understandings of moral rules.
"On Why Hume's General Point of View Isn't Ideal -- and Shouldn't Be," in
Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Social Philosophy
and Policy 1994
"Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory," in Moral Knowledge?, ed. by Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons 1996
"Hume and the Bauhaus Theory of Ethics," Midwest Studies (1996)
"'Good' on Twin Earth" in Philosophical Issues 8, 1997.
"The Metaethical Problem" in Ethics 108, 1997.
"Mill's "Proof" of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted Defense" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
"Preference and Urgency" in Journal of Philosophy 72, 1975
"Rawls' Theory of Justice" in Daniels, Reading Rawls
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism" in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond.
"Levels of Moral Thinking" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
"The Significance of Choice" in Tanner Lectures on Human Values 8, 1988.
"The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 12, 1992
Objections to both the aims and the methods of moral theory are apt to be based on overstating its ambitions. Moral theory comprises two interrelated activities: Philosophical Enquiry which concerns itself with explaining what sort of things moral principles are, in what sense they can be held to be correct and how we can know that they are. And Moral Enquiry, which looks at the defensibility of particular claims and the reasons we offer for them. The principles Moral Enquiry aims to uncover through the method of Reflective Equilibrium need not be comprehensive in scope, unifying the entire moral domain, nor need they be strict principles from which particular moral conclusions can be derived with no residual need for judgement. It is the aim of neither kind of enquiry to offer some external justification for morality. Rather they seek to depend our understanding of the reasons for accepting morality we are already in possession of. There is only a deep, general and independent sceptical threat to morality to the extent that Philosophical Enquiry underwrites . as Scanlon believes it does not - an e.g. platonistic understanding of the correctness of moral claims that would leave us with worries about how we could ever know them."Fear of Relativism" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Virtues and Reasons
Those elements of someone's mental life which are attributable to them as a basis for moral appraisal should be identified, Scanlon argues, with all their judgement-sensitive attitudes. Certain kinds of conflicts, conflicts between seemings (it seems to me that something is a reason to do something) and assessments (I judge however that it is not) can only be understood as involving desire at all if, as Scanlon urges we should, we understand desires as seemings in this sense: cases of it appearing to us that we have a reason to do something."Rawls on Justification" in Freeman, The Cambridge Companionm to Rawls.
A magisterial account of three of Rawls' central metaethical ideas: reflective equilibrium, the original position and the idea of public reason. The first is elaborated and defended from the common charges of relativism. Scanlon then explains how the structure of the original position is itself subject to justification in the light of the method of reflective equilibrium and how the idea of public reason originates in Rawls' dissatisfaction with his treatment of stability and congruence in theory as insufficiently alive to the fact of pluralism, a fact which requires that political justification in the sphere of constitutional essentials depend on nothing outside what can be a subject of overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
(ed.) Pleasure, Preference and Value (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1983)
"Moral Skepticism and Ideals of the Person" in The Monist 62, 1979
"Ethics, Personal Identity and Ideals of the Person" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, 1982
The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)
"Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationalisty and the Virtues" in Mind 94, 1985
"A Paradox of Desire" in American Philosophical Quarterly 13, 1976
"Meaning and Value", in Journal of Philosophy 87, 1990
(ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (La Salle: Open Court, 1942)
(ed.) The Philosophy of C. D. Broad (La Salle: Open Court, 1959)
(ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (La Salle: Open Court, 1964)
(eds.)The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright (La Salle: Open
(eds.)THe Philosophy of W. V. Quine, 2nd Edition (La Salle: Open Court, 1998).
Problems of Ethics (New York: Dover, 1962)
"Rationality Within Reason" in Journal of Philosohy 89, 1992
"Choosing Ends" in Ethics 104, 1994
Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)
"Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism" in Journal of Philosophy 1955
"Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles" in Hauerwas and MacIntyre, Revisions.
(ed.) Reason, Ethics and Society: Themes from Kurt Baier and His Responses (La Salle: Open Court, 1996)
"How is a Categorical Imperative Possible" Kant's Deduction of the Moral Law in Groundwork III" in Horn and Schönecker, Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.
"The Scope of Instrumental Reason" in Philosophical Perspectives 18, 2004, pp. 337-364.
"Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness" in The Philosophers' Imprint 5, 2005.
"The Hypothetical Imperative?" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, 2005, pp. 357-372.
"Cudworth and Normative Explanations" in Journl of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, 2005.
"Instrumental Mythology" in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, 2005.
"Not So Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, 2006, pp. 348-356.
"Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and 'Good" in Ethics 117, 2007, pp. 265-295.
"Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons" in Noûs 41, 2007, pp. 138-160.
"The Humean Theory of Reasons" in Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2, 2007 pp. 195-219.
and Motivation" in Philosophers' Imprint 5, 2005.
"The Limits of Sentimentalism" in Ethics 116, 2006, pp. 337-361.
"A Slim Semantics for Thin Moral Terms" in Australasian Joiurnal of Philosophy 81, 2003, pp. 191-207.
"Moral Scepticism" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 15, 1978
"Modus Ponens and Moral Realism" in Ethics 98 1988, pp. 492-500.
"Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit" in Mind 100, 1991, pp. 277-281.
"Why Oughts are not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me about Practical Reasoning)" in Mind, 1995
Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action (Cambridge, MA., M.I.T. Press, 1995)
"How Far Can Hume's Is-Ought Thesis be Generalized?" in Journal of Philosophical Logic, 20, 1991.
"Five Types of Ethical Naturalism" in American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1980
(ed.) Hare and Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
"Meaning and Speech Acts" in Philosophical Review 71, 1962
"How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"" in Philosophical Review 73, 1964.
Meaning and Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)
Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), esp. chapters 6 and 8.
"Imperative Propositions and Judgements of Value" in Theoria 11, 1945
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"Obligation and Motivation" in Philosophical Studies 2, 1951.
"Imperatives, Intentions and the Logic of "Ought"" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
"On Reasoning about Values" in American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1980.
"Hume's Law and Hare's Rule" in Philosophy 41, 1966.
"The Nature and Classes of Presciptive Judgements" in Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1967.
"Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 1983
"Well-being, Freedom and Agency" in Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985
"Positional Objectivity" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, 1993
(eds.)Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
"Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics" in Philosophical Studies 50, 1986.
"Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy" in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994.
"Supervenience and Moral Realism" in Ratio 7, 1994.
"Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism" in American Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1995
"Moral Judgment and Normative Reasons" in Analysis 59, 1999.
"A Defense of Motivational Externalism" in Philosophical Studies 97, 2000, pp. 267-291.
Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003)
"Ethics as Philosophy: A Defence of Ethical Nonnaturalism" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 209-232.
(Ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)
(Ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2 (OXford: Clarendon Press, 2007)
"Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason" in Phillosophical
Studies 119, 2004, pp. 265 - 294.
"Instrumentalism and Desiring at WIll" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35, 2005
"But I Could Be Wrong" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
"Ethical Justification and Case-by-Case Reasoning" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification
"Rawls, Brandt and the Definition of Rational Desires" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, 1978.
"Incomplete Routes to Moral Objectivity: Four Variants of Naturalism" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
"On Defending a Moral Synthetic A Priori" in Southern Journal of Philosophy
"The Intuitionist Argument" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, 1990 , pp. 91-114.
"Between Internalism and Externalism" in Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999.
Internalists believe (a) there is a conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation whereby (b) such that moral beliefs necessarily motivate. Externalists deny both (a) and (b). Simpson's proposed middle ground is to accept (a) but not (b): the connection is conceptual but defeasible. A psychological motivation for this view is sketched in terms of a relationship of logical dependency whereby someone cannot have a certain sort of belief who is never subject to a certain sort of "concern". For example one could never have the beliefs about dangerousness implicated in fear if one were never afraid. For what I identify as dangerous depends on what I am disposed to fear and so, Simpson reasons, if I fear nothing, I cannot master the concept. Analogous things he suggests, are true of the relation between moral beliefs and the moral emotions such as pity that implicate them.
"The Moral Belief Problem" in Ratio 19, 2006, pp. 249-260
"Propositional Clothing and Belief" in Philosophical Quarterly 57, 2007, pp. 342-362.
Generalisation in Ethics (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1961)
"Moral Scepticism" in Carter, Scept8icism and Moral Principles
"The Principle of Consequences Reconsidered" in Philosophical Studies 31, 1977
"Gewirth's Ethical Monism" in Regis, Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism
"Ethics and Common Sense" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 1986.
"The Triviality of the Debate over "Is-Ought"and the Definition of Moral"
in APQ 10, 1972.
"Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium" in The Monist 57, 1974
"Reasoning Towards Utilitarianism" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
(ed.) A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991)
"Is There a Universal Moral Sense?" in Critical Review 9, 1995
"Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas" in Journal of Philosophy 84, 1987
"Some Problems for Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism" in Philosophical Studies 69, 1993.
"Skepticism and Nihilism about Moral Obligation" in Utilitas 7, 1995. pp. 217-236.
"Moral Skepticism and Justification" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Kowledge?
"An Argument for Descriptivism" in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37, 1999
"Varieties of Particularism" in Metaphilosophy 30, 1999, pp. 1-12.
"Expressivism and Embedding" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, 2000, pp. 677-693.
"From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology" in Argumentation 14, 2000.
""Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 339-365.
(ed.)Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996
"Reasons and Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Irrealist Cognitivism" in Ratio 12, 1999.
Review of Svavarsdottir's "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation", BEARS, 2001.
"The Ontology of Reasons" in Topoi 21, 2002
"How to Derive 'Better' From 'Is'" in American Philosophical Quarterly
"Transformations of Illocutionary Acts" in Analysis 30, 1969.
"'Ought' and 'Better'" in Mind79, 1970.
"The Rationality of Aesthetic Value Judgments" in Journal of Philosophy
68, 1971, pp. 821-839.
"Morality not a System of Imperatives" in American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982
"Ethics Naturalised" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
"Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project" in Metaphilosophy 34, pp. 131-143.
"Moral Sentimentalism" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7, 2004, pp. 3-13.
"Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 39, 2001, pp. 595-610
Ethics, Persuasion and Truth (London: Routledge, 1984)
"Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction" in Philosophy 74, 1999.
"Moral Realism, Moral Conflict and Rational Choice" in Journal of Philosophy
"Deriving Morality from Rationality" in Vallentyne, Contractarianism and Rational Choice
"Should We Believe in Emotivism?" in MacDonald and Wright, , Fact, Science
and Morality, pp. 289-310.
"The Humean Theory of Motivation" in Mind 96, 1987.
"On Humeans, Anti-Humeans and Motivation: A reply to Pettit" in Mind 1988.
"Reason and Desire" in P.A.S. 88, 1988, pp. 243-258.
"Dispositional Theories of Value" in P. A. S. S. 1989.
"Realism" in Singer (ed), A Companion to Ethics
"Valuing: Desiring or Believing?" in Charles and Lennon, Reduction, Explanation and Reason
"Objectivity and Moral Realism: on the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience" on Haldane ansd Wright , Reality, Representaion and Projection
The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)
The problem that is of reconciling (1) the Humean theory of motivation, (2) internalism and (3) a realist understanding of moral commitments as beliefs. Smith first defends (3) arguing that the open question argument against naturalism is weakened by reflection on the paradox of analysis. He rejects however the idea that we can find explicit or reductive naturalistic analyses of moral concepts - Jackson-style network analyses in particular are vulnerable to permutation problems - but holds out hopes for a non-reductive, summary-style but still naturalistic analysis. He then turns to (2), arguing, against externalism, that the externalist must see the good person as motivated to do what is right on a de dicto reading of what is right and that this involves a 'fetishistic' attitude to morality. Internalism, read as the claim that judgements about rightness motivate us where we are not practically irrational is seen as a corollary of the rationalist's conceptual claim: that moral requirements are requirements of reason, a claim Smith defends. We should also, he argues, accept (3), accept, that is, that motivating reasons consist, at least in part of desires, given the teleological character of motivating reasons. In spite of accepting (2) and (3), Smith wants to understand value-judgements as beliefs, beliefs about what what it would be rational to do - more precisely what, in conditions of ideal rationality we would wish our (actual, imperfectly rational) selves to do. This, dispositional, theory, is the promised non-reductive summary style analysis promised earlier. It can be seen as naturalistic insofar as fully rational agents can be a part of the natural world. If we are rational we will have desires that cohere with our beliefs about what is rational and these desires will motivate us to act accordingly but we should not see the desires as motivated by the normative beliefs. In this way (1), (2) and (3) can be reconciled. This widely discussed book is impressive in the clarity and forcefulness of its argument. It also contains useful discussion of the views of, inter alia, Ayer, Foot, Mackie, Williams, Nagel, Gauthier, Harman, McDowell, Brink, Jackson and David Lewis.
"Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth" in Analysis 54, 1994, pp. 12-19.
Expressivists and minimalists can agree that truth has an analytic tie to belief. Given this the Expressivist can argue that moral claims are expressive of desires and desires are, given their functional roles, disjoint from beliefs. Hence moral beliefs are non-truth-assessable. A minimalist might do a Horwich and insist that expressions of desire may be truth-assessible. But this, given the analytic tie, would make them beliefs and folk-psychology, as Smith reads it, rules out any single state being both these things. Minimalist arguments do not show expressivism is false but merely the need for the expressivist to provide an explanation of the cognitive surface syntax of evaluation.
"Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude and Belief" in Analysis 54, 1994
Divers and Miller, like Horwich, want to allow that there can be minimal beliefs, beliefs that are not distinct from states of desiring. But there are arguments to the effect that this does not make good folk-psychological sense and his critics do not address these. That the matter is, as D & M observe, controversial is not to the point.
"Internal Reasons" in PPR 55, 1995
"Internalism's Wheel" in Ratio 8, 1995, pp. 277-302.
"The Argument for Internal Reason: Reply to Miller" in Analysis 56, 1996
"Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton" in Analysis 56, 1996
"In Defense of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord" in Ethics 108, 1997
"A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Response-Dependence Without Reduction" in Casati and Tappolet, Response-Dependence
"The Definition of Moral" in Jamieson, Singer and his Critics
"The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman" in Utilitas 11, 1999
"Search for the Source" in Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999
"Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?" in Crisp and Hooker, Well-being and Morality
"Moral Realism" in LaFollette(ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory
"Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics" in Ratio 14, 2001
"Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, 2002.
Evaluative judgements can vary in the dimensions of 1. Certitude: the confidence a subject has in her evaluative judgements; 2. Robustness: the stability of this confidence in the light of new information; and 3. Importance: the strength of the relative desirabilities we impute to things. The strength of the motivation it is rational to have in the light of an evaluative judgement covaries independently with both certitude and importance in ways, Smith argues, his own cognitivist theory of evaluative judgement is well placed to explain. Not so for noncognitivism which identifies evaluations with desires. Desires can vary in strength both with each other and over time. This does not seem like enough structure to accommodate all three structural features that evaluative judgements have. Suppose more structure is importuned by saying that valuing e.g. pleasure is a matter of desiring to desire it. We might then identify certitude with the strength of the second order desire and importance with the strength of the desired first-order desire. But this assignment seems arbitrary. Why is it superior to the converse assignment? Moreover when the second order desire to desire to Fis stronger than the second order desire to G the agent will always, on this account, be rational to desire to F more no matter how strong the desired first-order desire to G. Noncognitivism is thus, Smith concludes, ill-suited to capture both the structure evaluative judgements enjoy and the motivational significance of this structure."Which Passions Rule?" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, 2002.
Expressivists have to (1) say which subset of desires and aversions are those we express when we make normative claims (2) explain why normative judgements are, functionally speaking, similar to beliefs as well as to desires: for they are linked by support relations to a whole network of other attitudes. To do this, they must acknowledge that the relevant desires belong to sets of such desires which meet a certain standard of coherence, unity and informedness. But in doing that, they acknowledge that normative judgements are responsible to standards of coherence, unity and informedness. Hence normative judgements implicate beliefs about what we would desire were our desires maximally informed, coherent and unified. But there is now reason not to take the small step to saying normative judgements just are such beliefs. That they have the content they do suffices to explain, insofar as our .psychologies tend towards coherence. why such beliefs are functionally similar to desires."Neutral and Relative Value After Moore" in Ethics 113, 2003, pp. 576-598.
"Concerning the Absurdity of Life" in Philosophy 1991.
"Moral Realism: Blackburn's Response to the Frege Objection" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 25, 1987.
"Externalism in Ethics" in Philosophical Quarterly, 24, 1974
"The Argument from Motivation" in Mind 84, 1975.
"John Rawls and the Methods of Ethics" in PPR 36, 1975.
"The Open Question as a Linguistic Test" in Ratio 1975
"Three Sceptical Theses in Ethics" in APQ 14, 1977
"The Diversity of Morals" in Mind 89, 1980
"The Empirical Bases of Moral Scepticism" in APQ 21, 1984.
Morals, Motivation and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
The Nature of Moral Thinking (London: RKP, 1992)
"Full Information Accounts of Well-Being" in Ethics 104, 1994
"On the Subjectivity of Welfare," Ethics 107, 1997
"Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration" in EConomics and Philosophy 14, 1998, pp. 249-281.
"Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59, 1999, pp. 137-147.
"Explanation, Internalism and Reasons for Action" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
"Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," Ethics 111, 2001
"Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire" in Analysis 61, 2001, pp. 44-53
"On Michael Smith's Internalisms" in Erkenntnis 54, 2001
"Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, 2001.
"Moral Realism and the Amoralist" in Midwest Studies 12, 1988
"Pathetic Ethics" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals
"Moral Relativism, Cognitivism, and Defeasible Rules" in Paul, Cultural
Pluralism and Moral Knowledge
"Water, Drink and Moral Kinds" in Philosophical Issues 8, 1997.
"On Metaethics: A Reverie" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics
The Concept of Morals (New York: MacMillan, 1937)
"Intentions, Beliefs and Imperative Logic", in Mind, 81, 1972
"Defining Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire.
"The Authority of Desire" in Philosophical Review 96, 1987, pp. 335-381.
.Hypothetical Consent and Justification. in Journal of Philosophy 97, 2000
The .standard indictment. of hypothetical-consent-based contractualism is that hypothetical consent cannot obligate anybody. Stark argues that this indictment fails when we are concerned with moral principles as opposed to political obligation. While it is problematic how hypothetical consent could justify a political authority in coercing me into obedience to some principle, it is less problematic to suppose it could give me a reason to abide by it. Indeed hypothetical consent can furnish the basis of a justification of political obedience provided we understand the justification of the obligation to obey some principle or institution as independently motivated and not simply as falling, as a matter of conceptual necessity, out of the justification of the principle or institution.s legitimacy. Appeal to hypothetical consent need not be, moreover, otiose when it features in a theory that regards correct moral principles as constituted by the outcome of an ideal procedure in which consent essentially features.
"Justifying Morality" in Synthese 72, 1987
"The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" in Mind 46, 1937, pp. 14-31
and Facts and Values.
"Ethical Judgements and Avoidability" in Mind 47, 1938 and Facts and Values
"Persuasive Definitions" in Mind 47, 1938 and Facts and Values
"Moore's Arguments Against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore
The reading of "X is right" as "I approve of X" has the consequence that we may express moral judgements differing both with those of others and with our own at other times and all parties be correct. This, urges Moore, is incoherent. Not so, replies Stevenson, when we relativize to speakers and times in the appropriate ways. But then how are we to understand the parties as differing in opinion if what they say is not incompatible? Here, urges CS, we need a notion of disagreement in attitude which focuses on their incompatible purposes with respect to the influence of what they say.
Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1944)
"Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive" in Philosophical Review 57, 1948
"The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications" in Philosophical Review 59, 1950
Practical reason is properly responsive to facts, but which facts are relevant to it depends on what our substantive ethical views are, what we approve and disapprove of. There is nothing very special here about specifically moral thinking which can be roughly demarcated in terms of the involvement of particular kinds of feeling such as guilt and remorse and the role played by second-order approvings whereby we approve of our own first order approvings. Emotivism is preferable to naturalistic cognitivism in not narrowly circumscribing in advance the range of facts that can be ethically relevant. In particular we see here the advantage of construing ethical terms as expressing rather than designating our attitudes, thus avoiding the implausible upshot that ethical thought is "an exercise in introspective psychology". For emotivism, beliefs mediate between attitudes. Reasons for ethical judgements deal in such beliefs but "remain cognitive statements, open to all the tests of inductive or deductive logic." And there is no reason not to see this as exhausting the cognitive dimension of ethical judgement, favouring "an analysis that delegates all the relevant beliefs to the reasons, allowing the judgment to keep none of them." The relationship between reasons, so understood and expressions of attitude is however causal and not logical. Appeal to such reasons may resolve disagreements but we can't count on this. The cognitivist can't improve on this story by building some descriptive subject matter into the very meaning of ethical terms for any ethical significance attaching to any subject matter he so builds in the emotivist can recognize among the reasons for ethical judgements. As it will always be a contingent matter whether we approve or disapprove of any such subject matter, cognitivism as such does nothing to enhance the prospects of a "rationally obtainable convergence of attitudes".
"Brandt's Questions about Emotive Ethics" in Philosophical Review
"Reflections on John Dewey's Ethics" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62, 1962
"Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value" in Proceedings and Addresses of the A.P.A. 35, 1962
Facts and Values (New Haven: Yale U. P. 1963)
"Value Judgments: Their Implicit Generality" in Bowie, Ethical Theory
"Recent Work on Ethical Relativism" APQ, Vol. 28, 1991.
"Mrs Foot on Moral Arguments" in Mind 69, 1960.
"Agent and Other: Against Ethical Universalism" in Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 54, 1976
"The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" in Journal of Philosophy73, 1976
"Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology" in Journal of Philosophy, 1979, pp. 738-753.
"Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship" in Journal of Philosophy 78, 1981.
"Akrasia and the Object of Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire
"Emotional Thoughts" in American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1987
Plural and Conflicting Values (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)
"Emotions and Ethical Knowledge: Some Naturalistic Connections" in Midwest Studies 19, 1994
"Parfit and the Time of Value" in Dancy, Reading Parfit
"Emotivism and Truth Conditions" in Philosophical Studies, 70, 1993, pp. 81-101.
"Why Externalism is not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, 1999, pp. 77-90.
Why should I care that I ought toj? What makes the judgement that I ought to j normatively significant? What make it action-guiding? It might be thought that being a belief internalist about morality makes such questions easier. But Stratton-Lake argues that it does not. That I do care does not entail that I should. That a judgement is normatively significant depends simply on whether it contains normative concepts and - where a stronger sort of significance is at issue - on whether it is true. And internalism only helps with action-guidingness if we confuse empirical and normative senses of action-guidingness. The only linkage between judgements and motivations that plausibly holds platitudinously is one whereby the holder of a moral judgement is typically and not necessarily motivated. And any worry - à la Smith - about moral fetishism is alleviated when we understand that while the morally good agent must, for the externalist be suppose to have an nonderivative de dicto desire to do what is right, this is not the whole story about his nonderivative desires (ed.): Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
"Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 149-168.
"A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value" in Philosophical Studies 127, 2006, pp. 109-166.
The Emotive Theory of Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954)
"Practical Reasoning" in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.): Reasoning Practically
"Moral Relativism and Quasi-Absolutism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 58, 1998
"Moral Commitment and Moral Theory" in Journal of Philosophical Research 26, 2001
"Altruism, Solipsism and the Objectivity of Reasons" in Philosophical
Review 83, 1974
"Brandt's Moral Empiricism" in Philosophical Review 91, 1982.
"Gibbard on Moral Judgement and Norms" in Ethics 96, 1985.
"Moral Explanations" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth, pp. 49-78.
"Harman on Moral; Explanations of Natural Facts" in Gillespie, Moral Realism
"What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True" in Gillespie, Moral Realism
"Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn" in Philosophical Studies 61, 1991
"Nonmoral Explanations" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
"Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism" in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Soc. Phil. Pol. 11, 1994.
"Anderson on Reason and Value" in Ethics 106, 1996
"Evil and Explanation" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics
"Thomson Against Moral Explanation" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1998
"Moore on Ethical Naturalism" in Ethics 113, 2003, pp. 528-556.
"Ethical Naturalism" in Copp, The Oxford Companion to Ethical Theory, pp. 91-121.
"Moral Explanations Defended" in Dreier, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 241-262.
"Normative Ethics and Metaethics" in Ethics 77, 1967.
"Hare's Arguments Against Ethical Naturalism" in Journal of Philosophy 1967
"Value Judgements and Action" in Mind 77, 1968.
"Welfare, Happiness and Pleasure" in Utilitas 4, 1992.
"Welfare, Preference and Rationality" in Frey and Morris, Value, welfare and Morality
"The Subjectivity of Welfare" in Ethics 95, 1995.
Welfare, Happiness and Ethics(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)
Moral Cognitivism and Motivation" in Philosophical Review 108, 1999, pp. 161-219.
SS argues that moral judgements are not necessarily motivating - they motivate only when supplemented with a desire to be moral. Like Brink she appeals to cases where people seem not to be motivated by sincere moral judgements they make. When it is a question what explanatory hypotheses are on the table to explain such cases, she suggests the burden of argument must rest with those who want to restrict the hypotheses so available. She stresses that the internalist must not support internalism in circular ways - by appealing to an account of the meaning of moral judgements that internalism is itself invoked in support of. There may, it is granted to Hare, be cases where cynical, sceptical or alienated people are best understood as using moral language "in inverted commas". But she sees no non-question-begging grounds to insist that we must always so explain the sort of cases of motivational failure she appeals to. The paper closes with a lengthy discussion of Smith's "fetishism" argument. She grants that the morally good person's moral judgements motivate via a de dicto desire to be moral but thinks this is neither implausible nor reprehensible when we sketch a full picture of how such a person's motivation might function. In particular there is no reason to suppose de re desires to act in morally required ways are not also abundant and do not carry independent motivational weight.
"Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals
"Evaluations of Rationality" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics after Moore, pp. 61-78.
"How Do Moral Judgements Motivate?" in Dreier, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 163-181
"Emotivism and Deflationary Truth" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83, 2002
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"Ethical Internalism and Moral Indifference" in Journal of Value Inquiry 29, 1995
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"Reply to Critics" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, 1998. pp. 215-222.
"The Legacy of Principia" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics after Moore, pp. 233-254.
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"Justifying Reasons for Valuing: An Argument Against the Social Account." In The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37, 1999.
"Humean Heoism: Value Commitments and the Source of Normativity" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, 2000, pp. 426-446.
A rich and suggestive development of a Humean understanding of normative reasons. Desire-based accounts of normativity are typically rejected because there are so many desires that we don't regard as providing reasons. Quite so, says VT, but some desires (broadly construed) plausibly do provide reasons. In particular what she calls value commitments do. I have a value commitment to X when I have a pro-attitude to X, intend to continue to have this pro-attitude and take this pro-attitude to be justified by some good reason. I take a pro-attitude P to be justified by a reason R if R is constituted by certain considerations C such that I have a further pro-attitude whereby I approve of the state of affairs in which I stably continue to hold P when I reflect upon C (where there are no further defeating considerations D). Value commitments are things we allow a central role in planning our lives and assessing how they are going. For them to enjoy the requisite authority for this, they must be stable and we must believe them to be justified; and value commitments, as VT characterizes them, do enjoy just these features. A person has normative reason to pursue some end, VT then proposes, when her value commitments direct her to that end. This account allows for there to be standards for the evaluation of commitments but does not guarantee that such standards apply universally. In the case of personal commitments we might plausibly live with this. Moral commitments are more problematic. But the account proposed can still, VT suggests, do justice to the way we experience these as non-optional given, firstly, that it is far from an "anything goes" account and, secondly, that it is, so far, silent on how we should regard the value commitments of others.
"Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity" in Topoi 21, 2002
If we are to deliberate successfully at all, we need stability in our commitments, both synchronic (whereby not all our commitments are brought into question at once) and over time if we are to carry out extended courses of action. This gives us reason to cultivate a kind of character such that we are disposed not to reconsider our commitments except in certain, quite circumscribed, circumstances. Given this, we should not be impressed by the claim that normative authority could not derive from passions and sentiments as Humeans urge but must stem from principles binding on all rational agents as Kantians urge. For someone with the character trait in question would not be disposed to see themselves as having any reason to question their commitments even if they failed to believe that there were any Kantian-style rational sanctions to ground the authority of these commitments. And the robustness of their normative commitments would be apt to defeat any philosophically motivated conclusion that only Kantian-style rational principles could deliver normative authority (or at least to defeat any application of those philosophical conclusions to the practical deliberative perspective."Practical Reason and the Stability Standard" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, 2002, pp. 339-353.
The stability standard is a regulative ideal for practical reason that we meet when our confidence in our choices is supported by reasons in which we feel a confidence that we would maintain were we to engage in appropriate reflection on them. The notion of appropriate reflection here in ineliminably normative and must be understood in terms of normative standards the agent himself would be disposed to endorse. To reject the stability standard would be to think that, were appropriate reflection to render a practical commitment unstable, that would be no reason to change it. And that would be incoherent. To reject the stability standard, Tiberius suggests, would be to fail to count as engaged in practical reasoning at all. Appreciating the role of the stability standard allows us to see how we may reject the unattractive instrumentalist thought that reason has nothing to contribute to the evaluation of our ends while remaining consistent with the plausible instrumentalist thought that reason alone does not prescribe ends."Value and Practical Deliberation" in Philosophical Studies 111, 2002, pp. 146-172.
The goal that our choices should be acceptable in the light of standards we take it we ought to hold and continue to hold is not a rationally compulsory goal. But it is a necessity for human flourishing of a sort for whose value only someone who shared almost nothing of our ethical practices would feel a need to offer justificatory support. Given this understanding of deliberation, Tiberius develops an account of deliberative stability as a virtue: the virtue, roughly, of sticking to the practical commitments one has made (though not in stubborn or foolish ways). She also seeks to make sense of other normative standards of practical reasoning, notably the virtue of self-knowledge, the Rawlsian principles of postponement and inclusiveness and coherence.
"Moral Relativism, Internalism and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason"
in Modern Schoolman 69, 1992.
"Two Kinds of Moral Relativism" in Journal of Value Inquiry 29, 1995
"Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof." in Millennium 27(2), 1998.
"The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism." in Ratio Juris 11(3), 1998.
"Motivation and Practical Reasons." in Erkenntnis 47(1), 1997.
"Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification" in Ethics 97, 1987.
We can be foundationalists about ethical justification in the sense of holding some ethical beliefs basic and justifying the others with reference to them consistently with denying that any ethical beliefs are immediately justified. This is possible is the justification of the basic ethical beliefs makes reference only to non-ethical beliefs. Daniels has objected to this way of proceeding by questioning whether the non-ethical background beliefs that might look most promising in informing our choice of moral beliefs - beliefs about the nature of persons - cannot themselves be justified except by reference to ethical beliefs. Timmons argues that this worry is inadequately supported by argument in particular when we focus on views of the nature of persons that recognize the plasticity of persons and that avoid rashly universalistic claims.
"On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgements" Southern Journal
of Philosophy, Spindel Conference Supplement 1990.
"Putnam's Moral Objectivism" in Erkenntnis 34, 1991
"Necessitation and Error in Kant's Ethics" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1992
"Irrealism and Error in Ethics" in Philosophia 22, 1993.
"Moral Justification in Context" in The Monist 76, 1993.
"Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology" in Simmott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge
Morality Without Foundations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)
"The Limits of Moral Constructivism" in Ratio 16 2003, pp. 291-423.
"Supervenience, Externalism and Moral Knowledge" in Gillespie, Moral
"The Argument from Moral Disagreement," Ethics, Vol. 87, 1987
"On the Epistemic Value of Moral Experience" in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spindel Supp., 1990.
"Internalist Arguments Against Moral Realism" in APQ 32, 1995.
(ed.) Hector-Neri Castaneda ( Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986)
Sidgwickian Objectivity and Ordinary Morality" ni Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999.
"Ethical Disagreement and the Emotive Theory of Values" in Mind, 1951.
The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950)
"De Dicto Internalism Cognitivism" in Nous 40, 2006, pp. 143-165.
Reason and Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961
(Ed.): Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994)
(Ed.): Reasoning Practically (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
"Morality, Law and the Evaluation of Value" in Mind 94, 1985
"Can Emotivism Sustain A Social Ethic?" in Ratio, 1990
"Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem" in Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999, pp. 337-352.
Blackburn has no adequate account of how to understand the negation of an evaluative sentence. If we allow him the equivalence:"Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic" in Philosophical Quarterly 51, 2002. pp. 60-75
E. A accepts H!p = A hoorays that p.
We get this
N1. A does not accept that H!p = A does not hooray that p
N2. A accepts not-H!p = ???
N3. A accepts H!(not-p) = A hoorays that not-p.
But it is quite mysterious how we should fill in N2. Absence of an attitude is no good . accepting the negation of a sentence must be something positive. The model-set semantics to which Blackburn appeals imports a structure that Blackburn is not entitled to prior to an explanation of how evaluative talk of .perfect. worlds can be understood when embedded in the context of both a conditional and a universal quantifier. An alternative strategy that focuses on higher order attitudes gives us more structure but makes mixed contexts seriously intractable.
Gibbard, like Blackburn, has no adequate account of how to understand the negation of an evaluative sentence. He tries to unpack this in terms of the ruling out of factual-normative worlds. However if we understand this in terms of ruling out one.s acceptance of certain combinations of normative and factual claims, it will fail adequately to distinguish between denial and mere neutrality. And we cannot understand it in terms of directly ruling out the context of such claims unless we already understand what it is to negate them. In the case of Gibbard.s fully opinionated goddess, Hera, who is never neutral,there will be no space between not accepting some normative claim and accepting its negation. But for us imperfectly opinionated beings there is such a space and there is no satisfactory way to explain what it is for us to rule out some evaluative content understood as Gibbard recommends.
"On Grading" in Mind 59, 1950
"Some Questions Concerning Validity" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1953
The Emotive Theory of Ethics (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968)
"A Defence of Intuitionism" in P. A. S. 75, 1975
Contractarianism and Rational Choice (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1991)
"Particularism and Default Reasons" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
7, 2004, pp. 53-79.
"Resisting the Nuck-Passing Account of Value" in Oxford Studies in Metaethics I, pp. 295-324.
Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)
"The Guise of the Good" in Nous 26, 1992
"What Happens When Someone Acts?" in Mind 101, 1992
"The Story of Rational Action" in Philosophical Topics 21, 1993
"The Possibility of Practical Reasoning" in Ethics 106, 1996
"Deciding how to Decide" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Motivation by Ideal" in Philosophical Explorations 5, 2002, pp. 89-104.
(ed.):Philosophy and the Arts (London. McMillan, 1973)
(ed.): Naturalism and Normativity (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1993)
"No Norms and No Nature: The Moral Relevance of Evolutionary Biology" in Biology and Philosophy 2, 1987.
The Ethical Animal (Chicago: University of Chaicago Press, 1967)
Virtues and Vices (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978)
Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988)
"How to Argue About Practical Reason" in Mind 99, 1990, pp. 355-385.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1994)
"Reason and Responsibility" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Three Conceptions of Rational Agency" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2, 1999. pp. 217-242.
Review of Svavarsdottir's "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation", BEARS, 2001.
Review of Richard Joyce: The Myth of Morality in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003.
"Moral Motivation" in Dreier, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 182-196.
(Eds.) Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004)
"Feminism, Ethics and the Question of Theory" in Hypatia 7, 1992
"Noncognitivist Moral Realism" in Philosophia 24 1994
Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1967)
The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971)
"On Choosing Values" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978 "Comments on Frankena's Three Questions" in The Monist 63, 1980.
Ethics Since 1900 (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1960)
"On the Breakdown of Moral Arguments: A Reply to Philippa Foot" in Philosophical Quarterly10, 1960.
"Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perecption and Moral Properties in Australasian Journal of Philosophy80, 2002, pp. 75-85.
"Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation" in European Journal of
Philosophy 3, 1995
"Non-Cognitivism, Realism and Truth" in Philosophical Studies 69, 1997, pp. 73-91.
If Gibbard's normative logic has the resources to handle the Frege-Geach problem, RW argues, it is at the cost of going cognitivist. For it is only by going cognitivist that Gibbard can expect to explain the point of consistency and conformity to warrant in normative contexts. For motivating these notions requires us to introduce into Gibbard's story the notion of a "winning" world/norm system pair that is a suitable idealization of the speaker's community's norms where the property of holding at a winning world/norm pair (a) is normatively significant and (b) disquotes and these together, urges RW, suffice to make it truth.
"The Essence of Reponse-Dependence" in Casati and Tappolet, Response-Dependence
"The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning" in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6, 1998.
"The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2, 1999
"Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms" Philosophical Review 110, 2001, pp. 1-30.
"Internalism Explained" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, 2002, pp. 349-369.
"Practical Reason and Desire" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, 2002, pp. 345-358.
"Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism" in Topoi 21, 2002.
There are two views of practical reasoning: the constructivist view whereby what makes a choice correct is that it is the outcome of the right sort of mental procedure and the recognitional view where the correctness of a choice is determined independently of the mental procedure by which it is arrived at. On the recognitional view, procedural or internal norms for mental procedures for choosing are to be explained in terms of their reliability in arriving at independently correct choices. On the constructivist view there is no procedure-independent understanding of a correct choice to be had. Substantive versions of the recognitional view specify some substantive feature F and urge that we choose acts that have it. But, for any F, there is plausibly no non-question-begging answer to Korsgaard.s normative question: Why take being F as rationally decisive and not some other feature of the act? This is taken by some as a fatal problem for the recognitional view. However the very same problem bedevils constructivism. For any mental procedure P one can always raise the question: Why take being an outcome of P as rationally decisive and not some other feature of the action? We can however escape the problem by accepting a version of the recognitional view that is not substantive but formal: such a view says simply that we should make correct choices, choosing things that are good or choiceworthy. Here it does fail to make any sort of sense to ask: Yes, but why take this feature as rationally decisive? The view might seem vulnerable to a charge of triviality, of telling us nothing at all about how we may determine what is the correct thing to do. By itself, Wedgwood concedes, the view does indeed tell us nothing of this sort but the objection is defused if it nonetheless has . as he briefly argues it does - nontrivial consequences when conjoined with other plausible claims.
A clear and effective response to Johnston's "Authority of Effect". RW argues that said authority is less hard to square with either projectivism or dispositionalism than Johnston urges and that even if we were to accept Johnston's realism about the values affect is supposed to "disclose", that would fall far short of warranting an understanding of effect as a kind of sensory perception."The Metaethicists' Mistake" in Philosophical Perspectives 18, 2004, pp. 405-426. "The Meaning of 'Ought'" in Shafer-Landau, OXford Stuidies in Metaethics I, pp. 127-160.
""Is" and "Ought" Reconsidered" in Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie
"The Expressive Conception of Norms" in Law and Philosophy 4, 1985
"The Logic of Norms Founded on Descriptive Language" in Ratio Juris 4, 1991.
The Language of Ethics (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1961)
"Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity" in Journal of Philosophy 1963
"Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity" in American Philosophical Quarterly 1968
Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univesisty Press, 1971)
"Ethical Disagreement and Objective Truth" in American Philosophical Quarterly 12, 1975
Theories of Ethics (Lincoln, Nebraska: Johnsen, 1961)
"Ethical Realism" in Ethics 93, 1983
"Ethical Realism Defended" in Ethics 95, 1983
The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (London: MacMillan, 1906.
Ethical Relativity (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932)
"On Value and Value" in Philosophy 1991.
(ed.) Pragmatism, Reason and Norms: A Realistic Assessment (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998).
"A Note on the Emotive Theory" in Philosophy, 1959
What Is and What Ought To Be Done (New York: Oxford University Press,
"Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology and Quine's Holism" in Schlipp and Hahn, The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, pp. 649-662.
"Moral Problems, Moral Philosophy and Metaethics: Some Further Dogmas of
Empiricism" in Philosophical Review 62, 1953
"Generalization and the Basis of Ethics" in Ethics 72, 1962.
"Deliberation and Practical Reason" in P. A. S. 76, 1976
"Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life" in Proc Brit Ac. 62, 1976 and Needs, Values Truth
"Weakness of Will, Commensurability and the Objects of Desire" in P. A. S. 79, 1979
Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
"A Sensible Subjectivism?" in Needs, Values, Truth , pp. 185-214.
"Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements" in ibid.
"Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Beliefs" in P.A.S. 91, 1991, pp. 61-85..
"Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity: A Reply to Peter Railton" in Haldane and Wright Reality, Representation and Projection
DW distinguishes an explanatory Humean naturalism consistent both with noncognitivism and with recognizing the sui generis character of moral concepts and the kind of naturalist cognitivism that was the target of Moore's Open Question Argument. This argument can be read as raising a puzzle about the content of moral judgements, naturalistically understood, can be normative. It can be improved by drawing attention to "the difference between conceptualising our experience in a manner that is conditioned by the ethical and conceptualising it in a scientific manner." Normativity is glossed in terms of being categorical: moral judgements give all who accept them a reason that is independent of their desires. It is something that must surely to the content of moral judgement and it's hard to see how it could so accrue to naturalistic content. Both the noncognitivist and the nonnaturalist cognitivist are better placed than Railton's naturalist to make sense of normativity. But the nonnaturalist cognitivist can also find room for the possibility of objective vindication: we may think something is obligatory because it really is. He can allow a conceptual connection between moral judgement and the will to act accordingly but "only a presumptive and normal connection", a connection required if I am to grasp "the sense of the distinctively moral and political language that sustains the practices in which I participate."
"A Neglected Position" in ibid.
Because it is not always transparent which properties are natural, Railton's substantive naturalism is at least a "starter". But there are qualititative differences between the aspirations of science and those proper to human interpretative understanding. If V is some value property and X some natural property, the only adequate way to characterize V is in terms of the proper, engaged response to it. V must connect with the will in ways empirical engagement with a natural property does not require. With a fixed number of cases we might hope to find an X coextensive with V but given indefinitely many new cases, any understanding of value in terms of X would have to catch onto the point of attributions of V, make the interests that drive such attributions its own. This might be a proper aspiration but only insofar as it involves an aspiration to humanize our understanding of the natural. Such a study might advance our understanding of our evaluative practices and make us alive to possible alternatives but would always work from the inside. It is from such an internal perspective that the only vindication these practices stand in need of should proceed.
"Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty" in Hursthouse,
Lawrence and Quinn Virtues and Reasons
"Objective and Subjective in Ethics, With Two Postscripts on Truth" in Ratio 1995.
"Replies" in Lovibond and Williams, Identity, Truth and Value
"Is there Ethical Knowledge?" in Southwestern Philosophical Review 14,
"A Fallacy in Korsgaard's Argument for Moral Obligation" in The Journal of Value Inquiry 34, 2000
"Advice and Moral Objectivity" in Philosophical Papers 29, 2000
"Good Advice and Rational Action" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research" 60, 2000
"Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument" in Journal of Medical Ethics 26, 2000
"On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden" in Analysis 62, 2002
Smith has defended the practicality requirement: You are practically rational is you don.t desire to do what you believe you have reason to do; while meeting objections by contending that practical reason is self effacing. Sometimes you should not believe you have reason to do what you in fact have reason to do. Suppose this is true. There can then plausibly be counterexamples to the PR: cases where you should desire to do what you in fact have reason to do but you should not believe you have reason to do it. EW.s example is this: a couple with a declining sex life consult a marital therapist who wisely advises them to refrain from sex for a week. Believing (rationally but falsely) that they have reason to refrain from sex endows sex with all the attraction of the forbidden and reawakens their desire for it (which was the therapist.s cunning plan all along). So they desire (rationally) to do what they in fact have reason to do (have sex) but (rationally) do not believe that they have reason to do it."Theories of Practical Reason" in Metaphilosophy 33, 2002
Blackstone on Metaethical Neutrality" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
"Stevenson and the Referent of an Ethical Statement" in Analysis 23, 1963.
"From "Is" to "Ought" Via Psychology" in Review of Metaphysics 18, 1964.
"One More Flaw in G. E. Moore's Critique of Subjectivism" in Ethics 84, 1973.
Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of his Metaethics and Epistemology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974)
"Practical Reason and the Logic of Imperatives" in Metaphilosophy 11, 1980.
"Ethical Consistency" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 39, 1965 and Problems of the Self
Classic paper on dilemmas. When beliefs conflict I want to find the wrong one and lose it, without residue or regret. When desires conflict things are different. BW argues here that moral conflicts are more akin in these respects to conflicts of desire in a way that is awkward for the cognitivist. We should not think of the "ought" judgement that is decided against as inapplicable or eliminated. Rather we should accept that sometimes we have Op and Oq where ¬à (p & q), maintaning coherence by rejecting the agglomeration principle: Op & Oq ® O(p & q).
"Consistency and Realism" in P.A.S.S. 40, 1966 and Problems of the Self
"Morality and the Emotions" in Casey, Morality and Moral Reasoning
Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1972).
Problems of the Self (Cambridge: C.U.P 1973)
"The Truth in Relativism" in P.A.S. 75, 1975 and Moral Luck.
"Conflicts of Values"in Ryan, The Idea of Freedom and Moral Luck
"Internal and External Reasons" in Harrison, Rational Action and Moral Luck, pp. 101-113.
All normative reasons, argues BW, are internal reasons. More precisely, if some agent A has a normative reason toj then a decision by A to j can be reached by him via some sound deliberative route from the motivations he has in his actual subjective motivational set. By an internal reason, he means any normative reason which satisfies this condition - as he thinks all normative reasons must. By the agent's subjective motivational set, Williams means the set of his existing motives. By a sound deliberative route, he means not merely the correction of one's beliefs and sound means-end reasoning but also such things as: ascertaining how best to satisfy some element in one's set in the light of other elements; deciding which of conflicting elements one attaches most weight to; finding constitutive solutions- e.g. deciding what would make for entertainment given that that is what one wants; exercises of the imagination. The likes of brainwashing, hypnotism or deceit are ruled out. He argues that that to come to accept that I have a normative reason to j is to acquire a motivating reason to j. My accepting the normative reason claim can feature in an explanation of my subsequently jing. But he can make no sense of how accepting that I have an external reason might be supposed to motivate me.
Moral Luck (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1981)
"Ethics and the Fabric of the World" in Honderich, Morality and Objectivity
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985)
"The Scientific and the Ethical" in Brown, Objectivity and Cultural Divergence
"Hylomorphism" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6, 1986.
"The Structure of Hare's Theory" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
"What Does Intuitionism Imply?" in Moravscik and Taylor, Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value
"Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame" in Logos 10, 1989 and Williams Making Sense of Humanity.
To say someone has a reason to j makes little sense unless it is possible for them to j for that reason. Hence it is obscure what reasons could be if they are not internal reasons in Williams sense. The constraints Williams places on what can count as sound deliberation reflect what an agent already has in his S and, so conceived, cannot without argument be extended to include moral and prudential constraints. Talk of blame, like talk of reasons, makes little sense unless the agent could have acted in the way she is blamed for failing to act. Hence it is unclear how we can sensibly blame those who lacked an internal reason for acting in the way we wish they had. The picture is complicated somewhat by the way blame, like advice, .presents a consideration that contributes to what it is talking about.. There is a degree of indeterminacy in when we may say someone has an internal reason and consequently in when someone is properly blamed but this is less a problem than a way the account is true to the phenomena, an .intelligible obscurity. far to be preferred to the .unintelligible mystery. of externalism.
"Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research62, 2001.
"Reaching Moral Conclusions on Purely Logical Grounds" in Methodology and Science 22, 1989.
Reason and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)
"The Universalizability of Moral Judgments" in The Monist 49, 1965
Ethics and Actions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972)
"Lecture on Ethics" in Philosophical Review 74, 1965.
Moral Relativity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
"Castaneda's theory of Deontic Meaning and Truth" in Tomberlin, Hector-Neri Castaneda
"Commentary on Sayre-McCord's "Being a Realist about Relativism" in Philosophical Studies 1991.
"Relativism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics.
Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
"Reasons for Action and Desire" in P. A. S. S. 46, 1972 , pp. 189-201.
"Social Learning Theory, self-Regulation and Morality" in Ethics 92, 1982.
(Ed.)The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion between Philosophy and the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1990).
"The Possibility of Convergence Between Moral Psychology and Metaethics" in Wren, The Moral Domain
Caring about Morality: Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1991.
"Review of Simon Blackburn: Spreading the Word" in Mind 94,
1985, pp. 310-319.
"Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities" in P.A.S.S., 1988.
"Realism, Antiralism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism" in Midwest Studies 12, 1988, pp. 25-49.
Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1992)
"Truth in Ethics" in Ratio 8, 1995, pp. 209-226.
"Diagnosing the Naturalistic Fallacy: Principia Ethica Revisited" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 32, 1994.
Norm and Action: A Logical Inquiry (London: RKP, 1963)
"Is and Ought" in Bulygin, Gardies and Niiniluoto, Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life
"Is There a Logic of Norms?" in Ratio Juris 4, 1991
"Assimilative Moral Realism and Supervenience" in Dialogue 34, 1995
"Moral Realism and the Burden of Argument" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 35, 1997
"Quasi-quasi-realism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50,
"Moral Modus Ponens", Ratio, 1992 pp. 177-193.
Concerns Blackburn's quasi-realist treatments of the Frege-Geach problem. Discussing the Hale-Wright objection that moral modus ponens on SB's account is not valid as a matter of logic, NZ argues that the issue is whether we are in a position to explain why our thought involving attitudes should have a causal structure that mimics our that of our thought involving beliefs. Given such an explanation, it would be no big deal if the obligation binding us to the causal transitions in question were not strictly logical. Worries NZ takes more seriously are: how the quasi-realist is to explain the sameness of meaning of ethical propositions in embedded and unembedded contexts and whether the sort of story SB tells about conditionals can be extended to other embedded contexts (propositional attitude contexts for example).
"Quietism", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17, 1992, pp. 160-176.
"Quasi-realist Explanation", Synthese, 1993.
"Moral Mind-independence", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1994.
"Moral Supervenience", Midwest Studies, vol. 20, 1995.
"Explaining Supervenience: Moral and Mental", Journal of Philosophical Research, 1997
"Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism" in Philosophical Studies 91, 1998, pp. 173-203.
"Dilemmas and Moral Realism" in Utilitas 11, 1999.
"Against Analytic Moral Functionalism" in Ratio 13 2000.
Zangwill argues, against Jackson, that moral platitudes will not help us bridge the fact-value gap. Because there are no moral platitudes. Those who disagree profoundly with our basic moral beliefs - those such as Herman Goring - are certainly mistaken but the mistake they perpetrate is not a conceptual mistake."Externalist Moral Motivation" in Americn Philosophical Quarterly 40, 2003, pp. 143-154.
Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), especially chapter VI.
"Force and Sense" in Mind, 89, 1980
"Meta-Ethics Naturalized" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, 1980
"The Force of Hypothetical Commitment" in Ethics 93, 1983
"Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth
The "Is-Ought": An Unnecessary Dualism" in Mind 1962.
"Warranted Judgments in Dewey's Theory of Valuation" in Philosophical
Review 51, 1942.
"The Good as Harmony" in Philosophical Review 53, 1944.
"The Principles of Inclusiveness and Harmony in Perry's Theory of Value" in Philosophical Review 53, 1944.
"Methodological Guidance and Ethical Detachment" inPhilosophical Review 61, 1952.
"Objectivism and Mr Hare's Language of Morals" in Mind, 1961
The Concepts of Ethics (New York: St Martin's Press, 1962)
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